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ABSTRACT
Investigation of the Relationship between Firm-wise Financial
Factors and Firm Performance in the Hospitality Industry
by
Zhenxing Mao
Dr. Zheng Gu, Examination Committee Chair
Professor of Hotel Administration
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
This study empirically investigates the relationship between firm-wise financial
factors and firm performance in the hospitality industry from 2000 to 2004 using panel
data regression. After a literature review of firm-wise financial factors and their impact
on performance in the literature, unit-effect and time-effect linear models were proposed
and examined in both the restaurant and hotel sectors with different firm performance
measures used as the dependent variable (i.e.. Proxy Q, Sharpe ratio, and Treynor ratio).
While some variables, especially liquidity and solvency, were found to have significant
impacts on firm performance measured by Proxy Q and Sharpe ratio in both the
restaurant and hotel sectors, no financial variable was found to have a significant
relationship with the Treynor ratio in either sector. Implications of this study’s findings
for both the restaurant and hotel sectors are discussed at the end.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION
The hospitality industry is one of the largest and fastest growing industries in the
world (Walker, 2006). It mainly consists of businesses that offer food, beverages and
accommodations to their guests. Under the umbrella of the services industry, hospitality
businesses share certain common characteristics with other service sectors. Tangible
products, such as homes and televisions, can be possessed by individuals whereas
intangible hospitality produets such as, holiday memories and travel experiences, can
only be enjoyed and remembered by guests. Further, production and consumption of
hospitality products are often simultaneous and therefore, inseparable. For example,
guests experience the service and atmosphere at a restaurant while at the same time,
consuming the food and beverages provided by servers. On the other hand, hospitality
firms often differ from other service establishments in that they largely serve to travelers
who are away from their local residence, although restaurants arguably can provide
services to both locals and tourists (Harrison & Enz, 2005). Another unique feature of the
hospitality industry is the perishability of goods because some products, such as hotel
rooms, usually can not be saved for future consumption.
Two major sectors of the hospitality industry are the focal points of this study:
restaurants and hotels (including casino hotels). The restaurant sector includes
commercial dining and drinking establishments, such as restaurants, bars, cafeterias, ice

1
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cream parlors, and cafes. According to a recent industry forecast report by the National
Restaurant Association (NRA), there were approximately 900,000 restaurants in the
United States (US) with estimated sales of $476 billion in 2005, which equaled 4 percent
of the total US gross domestic products (GDP). In fact, restaurants have experienced 14
consecutive years of real sales growth since 1992 when inflation was adjusted. The
restaurant sector is the largest private-sector employer in the US. It employed about 12.2
million US workers in 2005, which is a roughly 9 percent of the total US workforce
(National Restaurant Association [NRA], 2005). Considering that 9 percent of the total
US workforce generates only 4 percent of total US GDP, this sector is particularly labor
intensive with revenue per full time employee (PTE) being well below other industry’s
standard figures. On the other hand, the hotel sector in the US is a $113.7 billion business
which employed 1.8 million workers with approximately 47,600 hotels and over 4.4
million guestrooms as of 2004 (American Hotel & Lodging Association [AHLA], 2005).
Hotels usually have a high seasonality effect either by day of the week or month of the
year, along with high operating costs relative to their revenues.
Corporate finance, by nature, monitors and evaluates a company’s operation.
Generally, only financial data can provide direct, comparable and objective
measurements for firm performance. Hence, financial analysis offers a very important
insight into a company’s overall performance. Financial management involves the
process of three major decisions: asset investment; capital financing; and dividend policy,
all of which have a significant impact on the performance o f different departments in a
firm (Chatfield & Dalbor, 2005).
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Given the significant role of the hospitality industry in the whole economy and the
importance o f financial management, there is a great need to advance the theory and
practice in hospitality financial management. Hospitality financial management will
affect not only a specific firm per se, but also the overall industry. For instance, most
hotels weathered the double blows of the 9/11 tragedy and economic downturn during the
second half of 2001. Nevertheless, many restaurant companies still maintained their
sustainable growth and achieved good performance as a whole during that time span. For
example, Starbucks realized the largest percentage gain in 2001 for its brand name within
the top 100 global brands (Khermouch, 2001). The success of Starbucks was multi
faceted, but at least two possible reasons for its success may be explained by its financial
management. Starbucks started to expand operations outside of North America in 1998
and geographic diversification helped to mitigate the economic volatility by having
operations in different nations. In addition, Starbucks had virtually no long-term debt,
which kept its financial costs to a minimum and therefore, made it better able to
withstand an economic recession. Its expansions were mainly through franchise
operations with smaller upfront fees and lower capital risks. Thus, quality financial
management can assist the hospitality firms in making healthy economic progress.

Research Questions
The goal of a firm is to maximize its firm value (Chatfield & Dalbor, 2005). Thus two
fimdamental questions for any corporate financial professional should be: Will financial
management in a firm make a difference in its value; and if so, how? Having noticed that
firm performance is also greatly affected by the general economy and financial
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conditions, the research interest of this study has been delimited to how firm-wise
financial features can influence firm performance in the hospitality industry. In other
words, the purpose o f this study is to investigate relationships between the hospitality
firm’s common financial components and its performance. Identifying and imderstanding
these factors can help hospitality organizations improve firm performance through
control and management o f certain aspects of firm financial factors. Thus, the goal of this
study is to help advance the understanding of financial management in the hospitality
industry.

Significance of the Study
Hospitality financial research has started to grow since the early 1990s and a rich
body of knowledge has been generated over the past decade regarding the question of
how to enhance firm performance by examining various firm-wise financial factors. Tsai
(2005) examined the impact of institutional ownership on firm performance as measured
by Tobin’s Q for hospitality industry from 1999 to 2003. After controlling for the effects
of size, capital structure, and fixed assets percentage, he concluded that firm performance
was significantly related with institutional ownership in both the restaurant and casino
sectors. However, there was no significant relationship between institutional ownership
and firm performance in the hotel sector. Gu and Kim (2001) explored the impact of
managerial stock holdings on the restaurant firm performance using the financial data for
restaurants from 1995 and 1996, while controlling their size and price/earning (P/E)
effects. The results indicated a significant and positive relationship between restaurant
firm performance and managerial ownership. A recent study conducted by Phillips and
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Sipahioglu (2004) revealed no significant relationship between capital structures and firm
performance using the data from 43 United Kingdom (UK) hotel companies. However,
their study adopted accounting profitability as a measure for firm performance. Further,
no other factors except the capital structure constructs were considered, which could lead
to a serious problem of model underestimation. By analyzing the relationship between
firm performance and dividend policy using hotel real estate investment trust (REIT) s
and non-REITs firms, Mooradian and Yang (2001) found that hotel REIT firms
outperformed their non-REIT counterparts from 1993 to 1999, using firm size, leverage,
growth and profitability as controlling variables. Their finding was consistent with
Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow hypothesis that more dividend payout was preferred in
order to meet market expectations.
These previous studies have attempted to investigate the relationships between firm
performance and capital structure, dividend policy, managerial ownership, and
institutional ownership, respectively. However, these studies lacked consideration of
certain firm-specific financial features such as liquidity and asset utilization, resulting in
potential model misspecifications.
Based on an extensive survey of major journals in the hospitality management field,
no studies on relationship between firm performance and firm-wise financial factors have
been conducted in a comprehensive or integrated way for any sectors of the hospitality
industry. In an effort to correct this oversight, this study attempts to examine the impact
of common firm-specific financial constructs on firm performance in the restaurant and
hotel (including casino hotel) sectors from two perspectives: imit (firm) effects and time
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effects. In addition, different firm performance measures will be adopted in the study to
better understand the impacts of firm-wise financial factors.

Contributions of the Study
The contributions of this study are three-fold. First, this study provides a
comprehensive review and investigation o f many firm-specific factors at the full
complement that may affect firm performance and examine firm-wise financial factors in
a simultaneous, integrated manner. A large number of previous studies generally
investigate effects of only a specific factor, such as capital structure on stock
performance. Thus, the results of those studies and the conclusions may differ due to
model construction effects. The approach adopted here paints a more complete picture by
evaluating more financial factors. The results of this study will be robust with an
investigation of a wide range o f theoretical factors. Hence, this study attempts to be
theoretically rigorous, compared to prior studies.
Second, this study employs a regression analysis with panel data to mitigate the
measurement problems for omitted or unobservable variables (Wooldridge, 2002). Using
panel data (both cross-sectional and time-series in nature), this study will be able to
empirically generate results more reliable and generalizeable than either cross-sectional
or time series data alone. More observations than a single year cross section group are
tested. Furthermore, this study considers differenees between firms (i.e., unit effects) and
the changes over time (i.e., time effects) to examine the relationship between firm-wise
financial factors and performance. These two perspectives will complement each other to
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provide meaningful results. Most o f previous studies in panel data regression usually
focus solely on the unit effects model, leaving time effects untouched.
Third, this study provides hospitality academicians and practitioners alike with a
better understanding of the relationship between firm-wise financial factors and firm
performance. As such may help hospitality firms to achieve better performance
practically. The findings of this study may assist hospitality executives in adjusting their
financial policies to enhance firm values. Many general finance articles use
heterogeneous and diverse industry samples to investigate the relationship between stoek
performance and its underlying causes. The results may differ across industries since
industries are not identical. Thus, a close focus on only one industry/sector may provide
better insight and overcome this possible industry effect. This study offers such a solution
to the problem with a focus on the hospitality industry. Further, like the customer and
employee, the investor is also an important constituent of the hospitality industry. Stock
performance is o f critical importance to investors’ vested interest in the hospitality firms,
and therefore, affects their desire to invest in the industry. Thus, investors’ perceptions of
the firm’s financial status may influence the firm’s market value and affect its stock
price.

Delimitations and Limitations
This study is limited to publicly traded hospitality firms identified through their
individual North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) code numbers,
which are listed in the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the American Stoek and
Options Exchange (AMEX), and the National Association o f Securities Dealers

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Automated Quotation System (NASDAQ) in 2004. One limitation is the survival bias
which is inherent in this practice. In the case of survival bias, the findings of a study tend
to overestimate the relationship between firm performanee and firm-wise financial factors
because only firms with complete financial data set over the five year period will be
investigated. Those firms which plunged during the time period will not be included.
There are also some eoncems with respect to financial constructs since different firms
could follow different accounting procedures.
This study combines the hotel and casino hotel firms into the hotel sector due to the
fact that there are limited observations in each category and they share certain
commonalities, such as being capital intensive and labor intensive, to name only a few.
Finally, although many other factors such as marketing strategy, human resource
practices, service quality, corporate culture, and information technology adaptation will
affect a firm’s performance, this study only focuses on a firm’s finaneial constructs and
more specifically, firm-wise financial factors. In other words, this study views a firm’s
financial features from a micro-perspective, which can be influenced by the firm’s
management.

Definitions
Activity. A financial construct that measines the degree of a firm’s ability to generate
revenues through various assets; also known as “asset utilization and management”.
Appraisal Ratio. Also known as information ratio, defined as the mean of the portfolio’s
excess rates of return on the portfolio over the market return against its corresponding
standard deviation (Goodwin, 1998).
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Beta. A symbol representing the systematic risk of a firm’s stock, or the undiversifiable
portion of the investment risk inherent in stock ownership.
Business Diversification. A firm’s strategy to extend the business to different industry
sectors.
Dependent Variables. Variables that influence other variables.
Dividend Policy. A financial construct determining how to distribute firm earnings.
Unit Effects. Also called firm effects which state that there are significant differences
among units (firms), such as company culture, locations, customer bases, management
style.
Geographical Diversification. A firm’s strategy to extend business to foreign nations.
Growth. A financial construct reflecting a firm’s future earnings ability.
Independent Variables. Variables that are influenced by other variables.
Institutional Investors. Entities or organizations with large amounts of capital to invest,
including pension funds, mutual funds, investment companies, insurance companies, and
endowment funds.
Liquidity. A financial construct indicating a firm’s capability of meeting its short-term
obligations and the quickness and certainty of an asset to be converted into cash at its fair
market value.
Jensen Ratio. A risk-adjusted index; represented by the intereept in the model that has the
excess rates o f return on the portfolio over the risk-free return regressed against the
excess rates of return on the market over the risk-free return (Jensen, 1968).
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Managerial Ownership. The proportion of the outstanding shares held by the firm’s
corporate officers, directors, or individuals actively involved in the corporate decision
making.
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). A method of estimating the parameters of a multiple
linear regression model by minimizing the sum of squared residuals.
Panel Regression. Regression teehnique applied to data that is both cross-sectional and
time series in nature.
Profitability. A financial construct indicating how well the management makes
investment and finaneial decisions to generate profits.
Proxy Q. A proxy that approximates Tobin’s Q; calculated as the book value of total
assets, plus the market value of common equity, minus the sum of the book value of
common equity and deferred taxes, all divided by the book value of total assets.
Sharpe Ratio. A risk-adjusted index; defined as the average excess return per unit of total
risk (Sharpe, 1966).
Size. A symbol measuring firm size. It is calculated as the logarithm of total assets.
Solvency. A financial construct indicating the capital structure of the firm.
Time Effects. It states that there are significant differences over time due to the
technological advancements, taste changes, general économie variations.
Tobin’s Q. A value-based firm performance measure; defined as the ratio of the year-end
total market value of the firm to the estimated replaeement costs of its assets (Tobin,
1969).
Treynor Ratio. A risk-adjusted index; defined as the average excess return per unit of
systematic risk (Treynor, 1965).

10
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Summary
The importance and necessity of the hospitality financial management were discussed
in this chapter. The significance and contribution of an investigation of firm-wise
financial constructs and firm performance for the hospitality firms were further
illustrated. The terms used throughout this dissertation were defined. Next, a review of
related literature is discussed in Chapter 2.

11
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CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW
This chapter reviews relevant literature with regard to the relationship between firm
performance and firm-wise financial factors. The first section discusses various
theoretical and empirical foundations in details with respect to these relationships. The
firm performance measures are reviewed in the second section, followed by a summary
of the literature that was reviewed.

The Relationships Between Firm-wise
Financial Factors and Firm Performance
Financial literature has explored the impacts of common financial characteristics,
such as capital structure and dividend policy on firm performance from a micro
perspective; that is, financial factors that differ across each firm and are under
management’s influence. Reviews of these firm-wise financial factors and their
relationships with firm performance follow, beginning with a factor relating to liquidity.
Liquiditv
Liquidity measures a firm’s ability to meet its short-term obligations and the
quickness and certainty o f an asset to be converted into cash at its fair market value
(Scott, Martin, Petty, & Keown, 1999). Liquidity is one of the firm’s key asset
management strategies to create shareholder value. According to Moyer, McGuigan, and

12
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Kretlow (2001), companies hold liquid assets for a number of reasons. First, because cash
flows fluctuate, a firm needs to maintain sufficient amount of liquid assets to run its daily
operations, such as paying salaries and wages to employees, repaying liabilities to
creditors, governments, suppliers and so forth. Liquid assets help a firm to handle the
variations in cash flow. This is a transactional reason. A precautionary approach to
owning some extra liquid assets to minimize potential bankruptcy cost is a second
motive. Bankruptcy costs work against the shareholders who are the residual claimers on
assets in liquidation (Van Home, 2001). If a firm's liquid assets decrease dramatically,
management must make sure that adequate future cash is available to meet the maturing
obligations. Any organization that can not meet minimum liquidity requirements would
experience great financial difficulty. Third, liquid assets are often held for speculative
reasons. Liquid assets can help a firm make quick investment when there is a great
market opportunity. Firms ean often take cash discounts offered by many suppliers and
pay off higher interest expenses with adequate liquid assets. Investment in liquid assets
can minimize eostly external finaneing (Kim, Mauer, & Sherman, 1998). Finally, it is
easier to determine the value of liquid assets and use them as collateral so that firms with
liquid assets can raise fimds more readily and under better terms (Haubrich & Santos,
1997). In essence, firms hold liquid assets to control certain shortage costs associated
with the lack of adequate liquid assets as liquidity shortage costs inversely relate to
liquidity.
Nevertheless, a firm would not maintain too many liquid assets because doing so
could also hurt the firm’s development and future performance for several possible
reasons. First, more liquid assets may create more severe agency problems than less

13
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liquid assets (Jensen, 1986). Agency problems occur when the management (the agent)
acts in a manner to maximize its own welfare other than the owners of the firm (the
principal) because of the separation of the ownership and control in the modem corporate
system. It is easier for managers to advance their own interests at the owners’ expense
when there is an abundant supply of liquidity assets. Second, liquid assets in general earn
relatively low rates o f return compared to other assets (Moyer et al., 2001). High liquidity
might imply that available resources are not being wisely invested by the management
(Borde, 1998). Firms can increase the expected return on assets by minimizing its liquid
asset allocation. Third, investment in liquid assets is costly because the firm must pay
non-trivial transaction costs to buy and sell liquid assets and because the firm may have
higher taxation (Kim et al., 1998). Higher liquidity lowers the firm’s ability to generate
more returns; therefore, firms hold only a certain amount of liquid assets to limit the
holding costs associated with the excess of liquid assets. Thus, a positive correlation
exists between holding costs of liquid assets and liquidity.
In sum, liquidity could have both a positive and negative impact on firm performance.
The objective of effective liquidity management is to find an optimal balance between
liquid and illiquid assets to enhance firm performance (i.e., minimize the total liquidity
costs), being aware o f the trade-offs between costs and benefits. In fact, the determination
o f optimal liquid assets reflects the classic risk versus return relations (Moyer et al.,
2001). Larger amounts of liquid assets are associated with lower risks and returns and
vice verse. Total liquidity costs consist of both shortage and holding costs of liquid
assets. The opposite impacts of between shortage costs and holding costs on liquidity
generate the U-shaped relationship between liquidity and its total costs which is

14
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confirmed by Gilmer’s (1985) study. Consequently, there is an inverse U-shaped
relationship between liquidity and firm performance as costs are negatively related to
performance. The optimal level of liquidity is the amount for which the marginal
opportimity cost of liquid assets holdings equals the expected costs of liquidity shortage
(Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, & Williamson, 1999). Bruinshoofd and Kool (2004) confirm the
existence o f long-run liquidity targets at the firm level.
There is also empirical evidence with respect to the relationship between liquidity and
firm performance. Some studies have suggested a positive relationship. Myers (1977)
posited that maintaining excess liquidity may help to reduce the firm’s distress, thus
enhancing the firm value. Further, Baskin (1987) provided empirical evidence that liquid
assets are used to signal staying power to retaliate against encroachment and to allow
firms to rapidly grasp new opportunities. Opler et al. (1999) examined the determinants
of liquid assets holdings of publicly traded U.S. firms in the 1971 - 1994 period. They
reported evidence that firms with excess liquidity generally have precautionary motives
to maximize the shareholder’s wealth which is considered a positive association. In
contrast. Shin and Soenen (1998) empirically investigated the relations between liquidity
and firm performance using a COMPUSTAT sample of American firms during 1975 1994. The relationships were examined using correlation and regression analysis, by
industry and working capital intensity. They found a strong negative relation between
liquidity and firm performance. The authors thus suggested that lowering liquidity to a
reasonable minimum could be one way to increase shareholder value.

15
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Solvency
Solvency measures a firm's capital structure, i.e., the relative percentage between debt
and equity instruments used to finance its assets. Solveney assesses a firm’s reliance on
debt and reflects the firm's ability to meet debt obligation and exposure to the financial
risk on a long-term horizon. Finance literature strongly indicates that changes in a firm’s
capital structure can greatly affect firm value (Pinegar & Wilbricht, 1989). Using debt
can significantly amplify the results of the activities undertaken by a firm. A firm’s
performance ean be leveraged from bad to worse or from good to great by using higher
levels of debt. Debt and equity each have unique charaeteristies. Debt financing has taxdeductible benefits at the cost of being embedded with potential financial distress costs.
Equity, on the other hand, usually asks for more returns than debt though the original
vested funds are retained in the company. The goal of solvency management is to craft a
good mixture between debt and equity financing so as to minimize the cost of capital and
thereby maximize value of the firm. Managers should fine tune the debt proportion to
fulfill such a goal. Further, there are several theories with respect to the eapital structure
in practice; namely, the optimal (target) capital structure model, the pecking order
hypothesis, and the signaling effects proposition.
The optimal capital structure tradeoff theory suggests that cost of capital is negatively
related to the tax shield of debt, but positively related with financial risk and agency costs
incurred with the use o f debt when corporate taxes, financial distress costs and agency
costs are included (Moyer et al., 2001). It proposes a U-shaped relationship between a
firm’s average cost of capital and use of debt. That is, adding debt in the beginning will
lower the cost of capital; but the cost of capital will later increase when percentage of

16

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

debt in financing mix exceeds a certain point. Such a point is usually referred as target
capital structure ratio. The equilibrium point arrives when the marginal cost of additional
debt is the same as the marginal benefits of additional debt.
On the other hand, the pecking order hypothesis developed by Myer (1984) argues
that a firm's capital structure changes when an imbalance between net cash flows and
investment opportunities occurs. The pecking order hypothesis indicates that firms have
no partieular optimal capital structure and they prefer internal financing (retained
earnings) to debt, and finally to external common equity as a last resort (Moyer et al.,
2001). A survey conducted by Pinegar and Wilbricht (1989) reports that pecking order
theory is more representative of how finaneing decisions are made in practice. However,
as indicated by Van Home (2001), pecking order is mainly a behavioral explanation of
why some companies finance through such orders. The pecking order hypothesis reflects
managers’ preferences in choosing capital structure.
The real world is characterized by asymmetric information between managers
(agents) with more information and shareholders (owners) with less information as a
whole. The signal theory described by Ross (1977) implies that a firm with better
outlooks can issue more debt to avoid sharing the benefits of the favorable prospects with
new shareholders. Unless a firm has a good investment opportunity it would not issue
debt because the issue o f debt would result in a higher probability of bankruptcy. A firm,
therefore, may issue debt to signal to the market that management has perceived great
projects, which are expected to generate sufficient eash flows to service the debt, as well
as enhance the firm value. Management intentionally links benefits in the best interest of
shareholders because issuing debt will affect the market price of the firm and
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management compensation package is closely connected with the firm performance.
More debts are preferred within the framework of signaling effect theory. Based on the
signal theory, a positive relationship is expected between debt levels and firm
performance.
Optimal capital structure theory will conventionally hold as an inverted U-shape
relationship between solvency and firm performance. The expected sign can be either
positive or negative. Adding debt initially will enhance the performance as the benefits of
tax shield outweigh the financial distress and agency costs. The trend will reverse when
debt reaches a certain optimal point when financial distress and agency costs are soaring.
The pecking order hypothesis and signaling effect propositions behaviorally explain why
and how some firms finance the resourees, which provide important insight into the
knowledge of capital structure theory.
Empirical studies have yielded conflicting evidence regarding the relationship
between solvency and firm performance. For instance, Grossman and Hart (1986), and
Zantout (1997) asserted higher levels of debt usage will be positively associated with
higher levels of firm performance. Similarly, Roenfeldt and Cooley (1978), Harris and
Raviv (1990) suggested lower financial leverage was significantly associated with lower
firm performance. However, John (1993) empirically showed a negative and significant
relationship between leverage and a firm's performance using 223 Fortune 500 firms in
1980. Likewise, Capon, Farley, and Hoenig (1990) reported that 90 out of 140
relationships examined in their studies have shown a negative correlation between firm
debt level and its performance. The reason is that financial distress costs (bankruptcy
costs and agency costs of debt) increase the cost of capital and destroy firm value.
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Moreover, the poor performance associated with debt use is beeause debt holders are
assumed to be more risk averse than shareholders whieh may force managers to abandon
all risky projects and cut research and development expenses to be conservative (Capon
et al, 1990). Thus, increased leverage eould worsen the firm’s financial performance. On
the other hand, results from Forster (1996) uphold the traditional capital structure theory
that the relation between leverage and firm performance is non-linear, using the panel
data of 56 agribusinesses from 1984 to 1993 in the US.
Activitv
The activity factor measures the effectiveness and efficiency o f the management team
in using and controlling different firm assets over a certain period of time. Activity
indicates how rapidly non cash assets flow through a firm and how quickly these assets
generate revenues (Moyer et al., 2001). One objective of financial management is to
allocate the best mix among the various asset accounts (Moyer et al., 2001). By
comparing the activity indicators for different assets, the firm can assess the effectiveness
and efficiency o f asset allocation. There is a consensus in regard to the direct positive
relationship between activity and firm performance. An increase in effective and efficient
use of assets will lead to value incremental in a firm; hence, improving its performance.
For example, Roenfeldt and Cooley (1978) confirmed that a lower activity ratio is
significantly associated with lower firm performance,
Growth
Growth presents an outlook of a firm’s future earning capabilities, which is a key
benchmark held by investors and creditors. The purpose of the growth is to create more
wealth for the owners through exploring emerging opportunities, improving efficiencies.
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withstanding market fluctuations, increasing bargaining power and succeeding in
competition with other firms. The growth factor may capture both business cycle and
economic development effects. However, Borde (1998) cautions that growth should be
carefully managed to ensure both internal structure and control of firm operations. A firm
can expand its business through internal growth, external development, or merger and
acquisition.
In theory, growth can affect firm value both positively and negatively. Firms with
growth capacity might generate increased market share and/or synergy effects, thereby
leading to favorable performance. The positive relationship between growth and firm
financial performance was tested and suggested by several researchers (Child, 1972;
Keats & Hitt, 1988). On the other hand, growth strategies often were criticized for
destroying firm value. One possible reason could be that management can increase
control, power and compensation through growth with no regard for shareholders'
benefits. For example. Hill and Jones (1995) indicate that firms might pursue the growth
at the expense of an owner's wealth. Fast-growth firms may be confronted with increased
competition and are more sensitive to economic fluctuations (Logue & Merville, 1972).
Idol (1978) suggests that investors perceive high growth firms as being more risky. In
addition to risk, growth can only bring in an increase in return to a certain point, beyond
which firms can not develop further because of the capacity limitation. The rising risk
associated with capacity constraints may strain a firm’s limited resources and its ability to
structure effective internal controls, thereby destroying firm value. It is the job of
management to balance growth and potential risk and seek the proper growth strategy to
fit their needs.
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Many studies have shown a positive relationship between growth and firm
performance. For instance, Roenfeldt and Cooley (1978) suggested lower growth is
significantly associated with lower firm performance. In an attempt to explore the
relationship between growth and firm value, Varaiya and Kerin (1987) provided support
that growth variables are consistently positive in relation to firm value. Such an
association was also verified by Capon et al. (1990). After meta-analyzing 88 previously
published studies. Capon et al. (1990) concluded that growth has shown a positive
relationship to performance. In the hospitality industry, Jekanowski (1999) pointed out
growth strategies have helped many restaurant firms sustain their success over the past
four decades. Not only does McDonalds strive to achieve visibility in all possible
locations, but other firms such as Kentucky Fried Chicken (KFC) and Burger King have
also extended their market share and dominance through growth both in the US and
overseas. The recent frenzy of mergers and acquisitions within the casino industry might
confirm such a perspective.
Alternatively, a number of researchers have warned of dangers of firm growth from
market pressures, which lead to damaging firm value in the long run (Fuller & Jensen,
2002; Ghemawat & Ghadar, 2000). Ramezani, Soenen, and Jimg (2002) reported
empirical evidence that maximizing growth does not necessarily maximize firm value.
This conclusion was drawn from the study of using US companies data from 1990-2001.
Their findings revealed that shareholder’s wealth was a concave function of growth, or a
commonly named inverted U-shaped curve. The study further suggests that companies
with moderate growth show the highest value creation for their owners. Investors will be
sensitive to any firm with dramatic changes in growth. Additionally, according to the
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study by Brush, Bromiley, and Hendrickx (2000), the relationship between growth and
firm performance could depend on the interaction of a firm’s free cash flow (FCF) and
other business situations. Findings showed that growth helps increase firm performance
for those firms that are without FCF or with low levels of FCF and without strong
governance or owner managed firms with low levels of FCF. In a rare situation, Gupta
(1969) observed no significant correlation between growth and performance using US
manufacturing data from 1961 to 1962.
Profitabilitv
Profitability measures how well management makes investment and financial
decisions to generate profits (Moyer et al., 2001). Profits show the past earnings. In
addition, profitability is likely to be distorted by data manipulation from accounting
“window dressing” effects in accounting convention and tax procedures. Profitability
emphasizes internal management efficiency, which reflects managers’ perspectives
whereas financial performance echoes the future expectations of existing and potential
shareholders.
Theoretically, there should be a direct strong positive relationship between
profitability and firm performance in general as expected earnings ultimately reflect the
intrinsic stock prices. However, empirical studies provide imperfect results on this issue.
Some research suggests that relationship between profitability and firm performance is
artificial at best. They cast great doubt on the attempt of correlating profitability and
financial performance, by suggesting the relation could be misleading (Sharpe, 1999).
O’Connor (1973) applied a stepwise multiple regression to a holdout sample to determine
the ability of historical data to forecast financial performance. He concluded that
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commonly used financial constructs, including profitability, were not useful to predict
firm financial performance. However, most studies have documented a positive
relationship (Jacobson, 1987; Varaiya & Kerin, 1987). For example, a study by
Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, and Moesel (1993) reported such a correlation. Hoskisson et al.
(1994) further confirmed that past performance (measured in accounting profitability)
was a good predictor of future performance (measured in financial performance
measures). They noted that profitability information appeared to be immediately reflected
in market performance. Fryxell and Barton (1990) found that relation between
profitability and financial performance varies over time and context. Nevertheless, the
general perspective o f positive correlation between profitability and financial
performance may be distorted for certain specific reasons. For example, a seemingly
contradictory relation of lower profitability level with relative high stock valuation in the
Japanese stock market can be largely explained by some uncommon reasons (Ide, 1996).
Their firms concentrated on growth in profit size rather than efficiency. The Japanese
government encouraged an export first policy. The interlocking relationship between
banks and firms further significantly reduced the risk. In fact, Japanese stocks were really
like a quasi fixed income instrument (Ide, 1996). In the US, the internet stock bubble in
the late 1990s revealed the huge discrepancy between expectations and reality. Many
analysts and investors used the so-called “life value” of a customer technique to
determine a valuation based on hopes for future profits which can not be justified by any
accounting procedures (Fortune, 1999). In a rare case, a study by Keats and Hitts (1988)
reported a significantly negative relationship between profitability and firm performance.
The authors explain that financial performance measures react and incorporate the effects
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of anticipated positive or negative major events before the actual occurrence. When
positive events occur, investors may actually anticipate a downturn because they believe
a firm has reached its peak. Thus, profitability and financial performance might differ. In
addition, dynamic environments will affect profits negatively and financial performance
positively. The collection o f these factors may contribute an inverse relationship between
profitability and financial performance measures.
Management Ownership
According to Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) agency theory, managers may act in their
ovm interests rather than the interests of shareholders. One way to mitigate the agency
problem between principal (owners) and agent (managers) is to increase the managerial
stock ownership so a manager’s compensation is directly related to firm performance
(i.e., stock price). Such an effective compensation contract utilizing managerial
ownership can align the goal of managers with that of shareholders in a rational and
efficient capital market. Managerial stock ownership can not only align managers’
common interests, thereby tying the managers to the firm, but also provide good
incentives for managers with outstanding performance records. This convergence-ofinterest hypothesis suggests that firm value will increase in accordance with the augments
of managerial ownership. Nevertheless, entrenchment effects will take place when
managers hold a large portion of a firm’s stock. Under this circumstance management has
the voting power to guarantee their jobs and may pursue non-value-maximizing behavior
(Belkaoui & Pavlik, 1992). Two possible arguments can support the notion of
entrenchment effects which were pointed out by Sundaramurthy, Rhoades, and Rechner
(2005). First, increased share ownership may add extra risk to managers who are usually
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risk averse, which may result in risk-reducing behavior that is against the shareholders’
best interest. Second, managers can control many of their own destinies and avoid the
takeovers by outsiders by controlling a large portion of a firm’s shares. Thus, there could
be a negative relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance.
Empirically, some studies find a significant positive relationship between managerial
ownership and firm performance. Kim, Lee, and Francis (1988) randomly selected a
sample of 157 firms from the Value Line Investment Survey during 1975 to 1978 and
confirmed that firms with high degrees of managerial ownership enjoyed abnormal return
to the firms with diffuse ownership. Hudson, Jahera, and Lloyd (1992) further supported
the notion that managerial ownership is a significant factor positively related to the stock
return. However, other researchers (Lloyd, Jahera & Goldstein, 1986; Tsetsekos &
Defusco, 1990) reported an insignificant relationship between them. Moreover, Morck,
Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) suggested a nonlinear relationship between managerial
ownership and firm performance. A positive followed by a negative and then a positive
correlation was presented. McConnell and Servaes (1990) also suggested such a non
monotonic relationship. As concluded by Kesner (1987), the association of managerial
holdings on firm performance differs across industries. The results of his study revealed a
significant positive relationship exists between managerial ownership and firm
performance for high-growth industries, whereas no significant relationship for low
growth industries was found.
Institutional Ownership
With a huge stake in all outstanding equity in the US currently (Hayahsi, 2003),
institutional investors have become powerful and important in corporate management
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decisions (Brickley, Lease, & Smith, 1998). Two theoretical arguments have evolved in
the literature to reveal the relationship between institutional investment and firm
performance (Sundaramurthy et al., 2005). The efficiency augmentation view posits a
positive relationship for at least two reasons. First, institutional investors typically have
obtained through knowledge about the firms they invest in by hiring professionals to
manage their vested portfolios with economies of scale. Second, institutional investors
have the incentives and expertise in monitoring the managerial behaviors at relative costs.
They can express their concerns about firm performance with the management team. In
essence, institutional investors represent a group of individual investors with a collective
influence to affect and vote on management decisions (Tsai, 2005). Hence, an increase in
institutional ownership will enhance the external monitoring and help align management
interests with larger ownership’s (i.e., institutional investors) interests. Therefore, a
significant and positive correlation between institutional ownership and firm performance
exists.
Alternatively, the efficient abatement hypothesis posits a negative relationship
between institution investors and firm performance because investors are passive,
collusive or myopic (Sundaramurthy et al., 2005). Institutional investors are passive
because they have certain legal restrictions designed to control firms (Roe, 1990).
Institutional investors may also conspire with firm managers against beneficiaries
because they have certain business interests in the firms they invest in (Pound, 1988).
Furthermore, institutional investors tend to be myopic and focus mainly on short-term
performance (Bushee, 1998).
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Additionally, there could be no significant relationship between ownership structure
and firm performance because a firm’s ownership structure can be endogenously
determined to maximize firm value (Demsetz, 1983). Diffuse ownership may aggravate
potential agency problems but generate compensating advantages that offset such
problems (Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001).
Numerous studies have shown inconclusive results with respect to how institutional
ownership may affect firm performance. Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) failed to provide
enough evidence to support the positive proposition of institutional ownership on firm
performance using a list of 383 Fortune 800 firms in 1987 by both ordinary least square
(OLS) and 2 way simultaneous least square (2SLS) regression techniques. By probing
the relations between institutional ownership and firm performance with a sample of
Australian firms in 1986 and 1989 respectively, Craswell, Taylor, and Say well (1997)
found a non-significant effect o f institutional ownership on firm performance after
controlling other variables, such as the debt ratio and research and development (R&D)
expenditures, to name a few. Clay (2001) investigated 8,951 firms between 1988 and
1999 and found a significantly positive impact of institutional ownership on firm
performance both in OLS and 2SLS models. Han and Suk (1998) tested the effect of
institutional ownership on firm performance using 301 firms during 1988-1992 and
concluded that institutional ownership can positively contribute to firm performance.
Other studies, such as McConnell and Servaes’ (1990) also confirmed that institutional
ownership is a significant and positive determinant of firm performance. On the other
hand, some studies found a negative association (Coles & Hesterly, 2000; Graves, 1988).
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Dividend Policy
Dividend decisions are one of three major financial decisions that any firm will
encounter. Dividend policy determines how to distribute firm earnings. Earnings can be
retained and reinvested in the company to stimulate the future growth, hence influencing
the future share values of its common stock. Alternatively, earnings can be distributed to
shareholders as current returns.
According to Gordon and Shapiro (1956) and Gordon (1963), the so-called “bird-inthe-hand” theory posits that firms distribute dividend to reduce investors’ uncertainty,
causing a low discount rate to firms’ future earnings, thereby increasing firms’ values
(Moyer et al., 2001). Conversely, firms that do not pay out dividend could raise investors’
uncertainty. As a result, the discount rate will increase and the stock prices will decrease.
A cut in dividend payment usually results in decline in stock price because it signals and
conveys the information regarding the potential unreliability of future earnings. Agency
theory also suggests that dividend payouts can reduce agency costs between management
and shareholders because the payment of dividend cut the available amounts of retained
earnings for management’s discretionary use (Moyer et al., 2001). This scenario was
conjectured by Jensen (1986) as a free cash flow hypothesis. In other words, more
dividend payouts or less free cash flow is usually associated with better firm
performance. Thus, a positive relationship between dividend payouts and firm
performance is expected from both agency theory and “bird-in-hand-theory”.
However, some growth companies have maintained high earnings to obtain lower
capital costs according to the pecking order hypothesis in the capital structure as
mentioned previously. Further, firms have increased financial flexibility which enables
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them to adopt the best strategy to enhance value. Firms that do not distribute cash
dividend may also signal to investors that the company holds a very positive expectation
regarding earnings and cash flow in the future which is at least better than the expected
future market returns were the dividend distributed in cash (Moyer et al., 2001).
Furthermore, dividend retention is preferred over payouts considering that personal tax
rate on capital gains is less than that on cash dividend income (Van Home, 2001). A
dividend-paying stock needs to provide a higher expected before tax return for investors
to accept dividends. Thus, these arguments will lead to a negative correlation between
dividend payouts and firm performance.
The competing theoretical arguments of dividend policy upon firm performance yield
mixed empirical evidence. Many recent studies have found that dividend policies have no
significant or neural impact on stock price (Christie, 1990; Benartzi, Michaely, & Thaler,
1997). Alternatively, Naranjo, Nimalendran, and Ryngaert (1998) reported a significant
positive relationship between dividend yield and stock returns, which implies a negative
effect of dividend payout on firm value. Conversely, using a sample of hotel REITs and
non-REIT firms from 1993 to 1999, Mooradian and Yang (2001) suggested a positive
impact of dividend payout on firm performance.
Business Diversification
Over the last four decades, the impact of business diversification on firm performance
has drawn voluminous attention from many researchers in a number of business
disciplines, including industrial economics, strategic management, and finance. Several
theoretical arguments resulted with respect to the reason why firms diversify
(Montgomery, 1994). The first relates to available resources which focus on a firm’s
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internal resources and capabilities. The second deals with market power advantages. Both
resource building and market power are consistent with profit maximization. The third is
involved with agency theory. Divergent interests between management and shareholders
and the existence of asymmetric information may contribute to the diversification
strategies that could shrink firm value. According to Berger and Ofek (1995),
diversification has both value enhancing and value reducing effects theoretically and
there is an unclear direction about the overall effect of diversification on firm
performance. On one hand, diversification across industries and countries can stabilize
the return and lessen the risk. For example, Shaked (1986) posited that multi-national
firms tend to have both lower systematic and imsystematic risk than domestic firms.
Belkaoui and Pavlik (1992) examined 228 Fortune 500 firms and indicate that
diversification can enhance firm performance. However, by investing the funds in a
diversified portfolio, shareholders can manufacture such a combination bn their own
easier and cheaper (Brealey, Myers, & Allen, 2006). A well diversified firm could have
an efficient internal market for capital and labor. Free cash flow from mature industries
(i.e., cash cows) can be directed to the growth industries within the firm, thereby
lowering financing costs (Brealey et al., 2006). In addition, the benefits of diversification
may also include greater operating efficiency, less likeliness to forego positive net
present value projects, greater debt capacity and favorable taxes (Berger & Ofek, 1995).
On the other hand, some researchers have suggested the adverse value consequences of
diversification (Singh, Mathur, Gleason, & Etebari, 2001). The rising capital market
sophistication, reduced regulation, and more transparent information have lowered the
benefits of diversification (Markides, 1995). The costs of diversification may consist of
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the use of increased resources to undertake value-decreasing projects, cross-subsidies of
poor segments from better-performing segments, and misallocation of incentives among
different segments in the firm (Berger & Ofek, 1995). Further, over-diversification could
generate negative synergy and diseconomies of scope which ultimately destroy firm
value (Singh et al., 2001).
Researchers have tried to assess whether business diversification can add or destroy
firm value empirically. Some studies have contended that business diversification may
diminish firm value (Bettis, 1981; Comment & Jarrell, 1994; Lang & Stulz, 1994).
Berger and Ofek (1995) estimated that diversification obliterates 13-15 percent firm
value on average during 1986 to 1991, which might be due to the overinvestment and
misallocation of investment. De (1992), however, failed to find a significant correlation
between business diversification and firm value. In contrast, other researchers have
indicated a positive relationship (Keats & Hitt, 1988). For instance. Campa and Kedia
(2002) and Villalonga (2004) provided evidence that diversification may enhance
shareholder wealth. Moreover, Palich, Cardinal, and Miller (2000) synthesized findings
from 55 previously published articles addressing the relationship between business
diversification and firm performance. Their results indicated a curvilinear model
(inverted U-shape) so that moderate levels of business diversification yield higher levels
of firm performance.
Geographical Diversification
Firms often diversify geographically to take advantage of their excess capacity of
resources to benefit from scales of economy, as managers know and learn the knowledge
and skills over time (Kor & Leblebici, 2005). Essentially, as a firm tries to realize the
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benefits o f economies of scope from client-specific knowledge and other common
tangible and intangible resources, partners absorb the internal transaction and adjustment
costs of coordinating and performing in multiple places (Helfat & Eisenhardt, 2004). In
addition, Capar and Kotabe (2003) enumerated several possible reasons why firms
diversify geographically as: cheap labor costs; market access and opportunities;
standardizing products and services; allocating resources more effectively and efficiently;
and increased bargaining power. On the other hand, a high level of geographical
diversification will increase operation costs according to transaction cost theory (Hitt,
Hoskisson, & Kim, 1997). Factors such as logistics, trade barriers, culture heterogeneity,
government regulation, trade laws, currency fluctuations, organizational complexity,
information and transaction costs will dampen firm development and affect firm
performance negatively (Capar & Kotabe, 2003).
Empirical evidence has generated various results, indicating there are several general
models in the existing research stream about this topic. The first suggests geographic
diversification is associated with linear and positive shareholder return (Bodnar, Tang, &
Weintrop, 1998; Tallman & Li, 1996). In contrast, a second view reflects a negative
relationship between diversification and firm value. For example, Denis, Denis, and Yost
(2002) demonstrated global diversification destroyed shareholder value by 18 percent. A
third viewpoint indicates an insignificant relationship (Errunza & Senbet, 1984).
Recently, many studies have revealed that the relationship between geographic dispersion
and firm performance is non-monotonic. In particular, a fourth perspective contends that
an inverse U-shape curvilinear relationship exists (Gomes & Ramaswamy, 1999; Hitt et
al., 1997), where performance increases up to a certain point and then goes down. The
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slope of the curve is initially positive and after reaching an apex, becomes negative.
Firms can achieve economies of scale, scope, and location if they undertake their initial
expansion in a homogenous environment. Later, when the firms enter the heterogeneous
markets, performance will go down because the increased organizational and
environmental complexity will elevate the operating costs (Li, 2005). On the other hand,
a fifth opinion has found a U-shape relationship between geographical dispersion and
firm performance (Ruigrok & Wagner, 2003), which is just the reverse of the fourth
perspective. Capar and Kotabe (2003) also support a U-shape curvilinear relationship
based on 81 major German service firms. Firms may encounter high adaptation costs
before they can enjoy the benefits of geographical diversification (Li, 2005).
Size
Size is a mediating factor that needs to be accounted for in this study. The
relationship between firm-wise factor and performance will vary systematically, given
the different levels of firm size. Different explanations coexist with respect to the effect
of firm size on firm performance. On one hand, large firms tend to possess more
resources and better chances to take advantage of the environment and capital market;
i.e., to expand the business during an economic boom or/and withstand market
fluctuations during an economic downturn. In addition, firm may gain from an increase in
size due to more reasonable economies of scale, more promotional opportunities,
improved efficiency in assets, capital, technology management and other operational
synergies. However, increased size may aggravate corporate red tape and result in a
dysfunction of managing the personnel and other resources. Small firms are more flexible
to adapt to ever-changing demands. The Fama and French (1993) model indicates size
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will negatively and significantly affect firm performance. These two conflicting
propositions suggest that the relationship between firm size and performance depends on
specific situations. Thus, in practice, firm size usually has to be controlled in order to
compare firm performance (Hoskisson, Johnson, & Moesel, 1994; Keats & Hitt, 1988).
Some empirical research also yielded mixed results. Gupta (1969) observed smaller
firms tend to have a lower performance. Keating (1997) also suggested that firm size is
positively related to firm performance. However, Miller (1987) investigated different
industries and reports that productivity is unrelated to firm size in the service industries.
In Wu (2006)’s meta analysis of relationship among firm social performance, financial
performance and firm size, the author revealed that there is no significant relationship
between firm size and financial performance.
As reviewed by Obi (1994), total assets are the second best indicator for firm size,
just after the market value o f firm's equity. Since market value is closely associated with
this study’s dependent variable (i.e., financial performance), total assets in its logarithm
form is chosen to condense the extremely large value of a variable. This approach is a
standard practice to develop a proxy for firm size.
Industrv Effects
Each industry has its own distinct characteristics. Some are labor intensive while
others are capital intensive. Some are fast growing businesses while others exist in
already saturated markets. In an attempt to estimate the relative importance of industry,
focus, and share effects on firm performance, Wernerfelt and Montgomery (1988)
confirm that industry effects are the major factors of firm success. That is to say, it is
deemed to be appropriate to compare firm performance within a homogeneous industry.
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rather than a heterogeneous group. Further, Hawawini, Subramanian, and Verdin (2003)
find that a significant proportion of variation in firm factors is due to the presence of a
few exceptional firms in any industry. In other words, for most ordinary firms, the
industry effects appear to be more important for performance than firm-specific factors.
Lancaster, Stevens, and Jeimings (1999) conclude that “industry effects are found in
capital structure, risk, returns, and financial ratio pattern” (p.43). Two major sectors
within the hospitality industry are restaurants and hotels (including casino hotels), which
are the focus in the study. A dichotomous variable will be assigned to describe these two
sectors.
To reiterate, many firm-wise financial factors, (i.e., liquidity, solvency, activity,
growth, profitability, managerial ownership, institutional ownership, dividend policy,
business diversification and geographical diversification) have appeared in the literature
that could affect the firm market performance, with size and industry effects as control
variables.

Firm Performance Measures Review
Only financial market performance measures will be used in this study to evaluate
hospitality firm performance as these data are objective, direct and available. Firm
performance measures are obtained fi’om the stock market data, based on the firm’s future
expected earnings. From a theoretical perspective, firm performance measures express
the expected value of future cash flows and may affect firm’s outlook in the long run. In
addition, these firm performance measures are thought to be robust to the management
practices and accounting conventions under the efficient market hypothesis. Among a
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substantial number of firm performance measures, Tobin’s Q, as well as some other riskadjusted performance measures, such as the Treynor ratio and the Sharpe ratio, are also
widely used in the literature.
Tobin's Q is defined as the firm's market value divided by the replacement cost of its
assets, which is forward-looking, risk adjusted, and less susceptible to changes in
accounting practices (Montgomery & Wernerfelt, 1988; Tobin, 1969). Tobin's Q reflects
the market's prediction of the returns generated per dollar of investment in corporate
assets (Landsman & Shapiro, 1995) and addresses growing concerns over the limitation
of accounting measures (Fisher & McGowan, 1983). When the value of Tobin's Q is
larger than one, a firm is worth more than the cost, meaning excess profits are being
earned and these profits are above the level necessary to keep the firm in the industry
(Lindenberg & Ross, 1981). According to Lloyd and Jahera (1994), Tobin's Q takes the
advantage o f minimizing distortions caused by tax laws and accounting procedures often
related with accounting measures. Tobin's Q measures firm performance involving
investors’ attitudes (Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001). Over the past several decades, many
researchers have devised different formulas to measure Tobin's Q: L-R Q (Lindenberg &
Ross, 1981); Approximate Q (Chung & Pruitt, 1994); and Simple Q (Perfect & Wiles,
1994), to name just a few. In this study, a Proxy Q (Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick, 2003)
will be adopted to measure Tobin's Q for its simplicity and availability of data. Using the
Proxy Q can avoid possible distortions fi*om the estimation of replacement costs of
calculating Tobin’s Q (Clay, 2001, Kaplan & Zingales, 1997). Proxy Q can be
operationally defined as:
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^

{ASSET + E Q U I T Y - { C E + DT))
G = --------------------------------------------------

where:
ASSET, the book value o f total assets;
EQUITY: the market value of equity;
CE: the book value o f common equity; and,
DT: deferred taxes.

Kaplan and Zingales (1997), Gompers et al. (2003), and Clay (2001) also use this Proxy
Q to measure firm performance in their studies.
Four portfolio performance indexes, namely Treynor ratio, Sharpe ratio, Jensen ratio,
and Appraisal ratio, have been proposed to measure financial performance on a riskadjusted basis (Reilly & Brown, 1999). Two of these measures (Treynor ratio and Jensen
ratio) consider only systematic risk as relevant risk factor whereas another two of
measures (Sharpe ratio and Appraisal ratio) include total risk as a risk factor. Numerous
previous studies have employed these measures (Dubofsky & Varadarajan, 1987;
Hoskisson et al., 1994; Michel & Shaked, 1984). These four measures are defined and
discussed below.
(1) Treynor ratio (Treynor, 1965). This ratio is defined as:
pj>

- ^P’‘

~

'

where:
PRj. is the Treynor performance ratio;
Rp , is the average rate of return for stock p at time t;
R f , is the average rate of risk free return at time t; and,
/Ip I is the beta for stock p at time t.
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The return for bearing risk, or the excess return over risk-free rate, equals the
portfolio return ( Rp , ) minus the risk-free return ( R^ , ) in the numerator. Beta ( pp , ) is
the measure o f a portfolio's systematic risk in the denominator. The Treynor ratio is based
on the Capital Assets Pricing Model (CAPM) (Lintner, 1965; Sharpe, 1964). The ratio
implicitly assumes a completely diversified portfolio and considers only the systematic
risk or Beta as the relevant risk in performance measurement within the CPAM
framework. The Treynor ratio is an index of the average excess return per unit of
systematic risk. It is thus a reliable performance measure for a well-diversified portfolio
(Treynor, 1965). Evidently, the higher

, the better the firm’s performance.

(2) Sharpe ratio (Sharpe, 1966). This ratio is expressed as:

PRs
where:
PRg is the Sharpe performance ratio;
Rp , is the average rate of return for portfolio p at time t;
R j I is the average rate o f risk-free return at time t; and,
<Tp, is the standard deviation for portfolio p at time t.

The Sharpe ratio divides portfolio risk premium, namely, the difference between the
portfolio return ( Rp , ) minus the risk-free rate ( Py , ) by its standard deviation or the total
risk. The Sharpe ratio uses the stock’s standard deviation for risk measurement, so it
considers the total risk rather than just the systematic risk because investors may not hold
a well-diversified portfolio. Unsystematic risk is pertinent in the formation of the Sharpe
ratio, which goes beyond the CAPM model. This ratio shows the average excess return
per unit of total risk and measures the reward to total volatility trade-off. As the Sharpe
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ratio utilizes portfolio standard deviation as relevant risk, it is an appropriate measure for
both well-diversified and poorly-diversified portfolios (Sharpe, 1966). Theoretically, a
larger PR^ indicates a better portfolio performance for the reason that total risk may be
rewarded with relative larger excess return.
(3) Jensen ratio (Jensen, 1968). The Jensen ratio is contained in the equation below:
i^p,t -

+ Pp

- Rf., ) + £p,,

where:
, is the Jensen performance ratio;
Pp is the beta or systematic risk for portfolio p;
R p, is the average rate of return for portfolio p at time t;
R f , is the average rate o f risk-free return at time t;
R„, , is the average rate o f market portfolio at time t; and,
Sp , is the random error terms with E{£p, ) = 0.

The Jensen ratio (

, ), like the Treynor ratio, is also based on the CAPM model that

assumes systematic risk, or beta, as the only relevant risk. As shown in the equation
above, the Jensen ratio is essentially represented by the intercept in the model that has the
excess rates of return on the portfolio over the risk-free return (dependant variable)
regressed against the excess rates of return on the market over the risk-free return
(independent variable). While a significant and positive
performing against the market, a significant but negative

, indicates a portfolio is out
, is a sign of its

underperformance. Similar to the Treynor ratio, the Jenson ratio is an appropriate
performance measure for a well-diversified portfolio (Jensen, 1968).
(4) Appraisal ratio (Treynor & Black, 1973; Goodwin, 1998). This ratio is defined as
below:
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PR,

R

-R

= - ^ ---------^
° p - m ,t

where:
PR^ is the Appraisal performance ratio;
Rp, is the average rate o f return for portfolio p at time t;

i?„,, is the average rate o f market return at time t; and,
CTp_„,, is the standard deviation of excess return for portfolio p at time t.
The appraisal ratio, also known as the information ratio, equals the mean of the
portfolio’s excess rates o f return (i.e., difference between portfolio and market return) on
the portfolio over the market return against its corresponding standard deviation. The
numerator represents the excess return whereas the denominator indicates the
unsystematic risk associated with the pursuit of the excess return (Goodwin, 1998). This
ratio indicates the average excess return per unit of volatility in excess return. The
Appraisal ratio is a good measure for all kinds of portfolios, including well-diversified
and less-diversified portfolios (Goodwin, 1998).
For all these ratios, firms demonstrating a higher, positive value should have a greater
financial accomplishment. In this study, only the Tobin's Q, the Sharpe and the Treynor
ratios will be adopted to measure firm performance, as each of them measures valuebased, total risk-adjusted and systematic risk-adjusted performance, correspondingly.

Summary
Hypothetical arguments and empirical evidence on the relationship between firmwise financial factors and firm performance were presented in Chapter 2. Major firm
financial performance measures were also discussed. The review of related financial
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literature theoretieally directs the model eonstruction in this study to examine these
relationships in the hospitality industry. The following chapter will present the research
design and methodology for this study.
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CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
The literature review in Chapter 2 provides both theoretical and empirical foundations
for using a multiple regression technique to examine the relationship between firm-wise
financial factors and firm performance in this study. In particular, panel regression
analysis will be performed because it relates regression techniques with panel data, of
which are both eross-sectional and time-series. The first section of this chapter will
present several hypotheses and a model constructed for this study, and the following
sections will discuss the panel regression method and its underlying assumptions, and
then demonstrate how to operationalize the model with a sample and data collection.

Hypotheses
The following hypotheses will be tested in this study, which are derived from both the
research questions stated in Chapter 1 and the literature review in Chapter 2.
HYPOTHESIS I: The investigated firm-wise financial factors will have impacts on firm
performance in terms of value-based return in the restaurant sector;
HYPOTHESIS II: The investigated firm-wise financial factors will have impacts on firm
performance in terms of total risk-adjusted return in the restaurant sector;
HYPOTHESIS III: The investigated firm-wise financial factors will have impacts on firm
performance in terms o f systematic risk-adjusted return in the restaurant sector;
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HYPOTHESIS IV: The investigated firm-wise financial factors will have impacts on
firm performance in terms o f value-based return in the hotel sector;
HYPOTHESIS V : The investigated firm-wise financial factors will have impacts on firm
performance in terms of total risk-adjusted return in the hotel sector;
HYPOTHESIS VI: The investigated firm-wise financial factors will have impacts on firm
performance in terms of systematic risk-adjusted return in the hotel sector.

The Proposed Model
In consideration of both research questions and the related literature that was
discussed in Chapter 2, the following equation [Eq (1)] is proposed to investigate the
relationship between firm-wise financial factors and performance. Firm performance is
the dependent variable and different firm-speeifie financial factors and control variables
are the independent variables.
(1)
(=1

Where:
Y : firm performance (FP);

Y ,...Y ,: liquidity (L), solvency (S), activity (A), growth (G), profitability (P), dividend
payout (D), business diversification (BD), geographical diversification (GD), log of total
assets (SIZE), respectively; and SIZE is a control variable;
Po: constant;
Pi- Pg: coefficients o fX y ..X g ; and,
e: error term.
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A graphical representation of the proposed linear model is presented in Figure 1.

SIZE

GD
FP

BD

Figure 1. The proposed linear model.
Note. L: liquidity, S; solvency, A: activity, G: growth, P: profitability, D: dividend

payout, BD: business diversification, GD: geographical diversification. Size: log of total
assets, FP: firm performance.

Here, different firm performance measures (Tobin’s Q, Sharpe ratio, and Treynor
ratio) will be entered respectively as the dependent variable in order to capture firm
performance from various perspectives (value-based return, total risk-adjusted return, and
systematic risk-adjusted return). This model will be tested for the restaurant and hotel
sectors separately to account for possible industry effects. Many hospitality firms have
not paid out dividends, nor implemented either business or geographical diversification
during this investigated time span (i.e., 2000-2004); hence, data of the aforementioned
factors were measured dichotomously. Instead of asking how much these factors could
contribute to firm performance, this study attempts to inquire whether the existence of
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these factors made significant differences in financial performance of the hospitality
firms. Institutional ownership and managerial ownership will not be examined in this
study due to their being unavailable in the financial databases. The signs of the
coefficients of all independent variables are not forecasted beforehand except the factors
of activity and profitability due to the fact that many contradictory theories about their
relationship with firm performance coexisted in the literature. The expected signs of the
coefficients o f activity and profitability variables are both positive. Higher values of
activity and profitability factors would be generally considered as better for firm
performance as discussed in Chapter 2.

Panel Regression and its Assumptions
Panel Regression
Observations on many individual economic units, such as firms, over a period of time
comprise a panel, cross-sectional time-series or longitudinal data set (Wooldridge, 2002).
Panel data are different from pure cross-section data and pure time-series data. Instead,
panel data analysis has both a spatial and temporal dimension. The spatial dimension
involves a group of cross-sectional units of samples, such as individuals and firms. The
temporal dimension relates to the variables of these cross-sectional groups changing over
a period of time. Panel data entail the same responding units to be measured at different
time so that data are dependent. Pooled data, on the other hand, usually take different
samples over the time and are assumed to be independent. A balanced panel exists when
the data set has no missing values. If there are some missing values in the data set, it is
called an unbalanced panel.
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Hsiao (2003) cites literature documenting several advantages o f adopting panel data.
Firstly, panel data usually contain a larger number of observations than would crosssectional or time-series data, increasing the degrees of freedom and reducing the possible
multicollinearity among explanatory variables, thereby improving the efficiency and
reliability of model estimates. Secondly, panel data allow a researcher to analyze a
number of dynamic relationships which can not be addressed using solely cross-sectional
data. Similarly, panel data allow one to investigate cross-sectional relations that strictly
time-series data prohibit. It allows testing or controlling for within subject change over
time for aggregate data. It provides important detail that aggregated time-series data
overlook. Thirdly, panel data allow controlling the effects of missing or unobserved
variables in a more natural way. Omitted variables may lead to changes in time-series and
cross-section intercepts. For instance, firms may have latent (i.e., unobservable)
characteristics (e.g., changes in technology, tastes, or business cycle conditions) that
remain constant among units, but differ over time. With panel data, it is possible to
control for such types o f omitted variables by observing changes in the dependent
variable over time (Panel Data, 2006). Therefore, the risk associated with an under
specified model is greatly mitigated. Finally, panel data allow for more accurate
predictions for individual outcomes than time series data alone. The major disadvantage
of panel data analysis is the increased complexity in analysis and interpretations (Hsiao,
2003).
Panel data has both a cross-sectional and time-series dimension. Therefore, two types
of perspectives come into play with respect to the differences from either the crosssectional dimension or time-series dimension. When the time dimension is assumed to be
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fixed while the cross-sectional dimension is assumed to be different, it is called unit
effects model. On the other hand, switching the dimensions will result in time effects
model (Park, 2005). Unit effects model considers each unit has heterogeneous features,
such as location, which are either omitted or unobservable. In converse, time effects
model regards different time has unique dynamics, which plays an important role to
explain the variance in the model. Generally speaking, the results under these 2
perspectives are fairly different due to their different underlying assumptions.
Traditionally the approach in panel data regression has been the unit effects model for
two obvious reasons. First, most units in a panel are very different for many unobservable
or immeasurable factors despite these units may come from a homogenous group.
Second, time frame in a panel data set tends to be relative short, say, 5 to 10 years. The
changes during the period usually are trivial, if not minimal, which can often be
neglected. Nevertheless, in this study, both unit effects and time effects model are
examined to ensure the rigors o f the study.
As far as the model is concerned, there are several types of panel data models in the
literature: constant coefficients models, fixed effects models, and random effects models
(Yaffee, 2003). These are discussed next.
The constant coefficients model is the simplest one because it assumes constant
coefficients in both intercepts and slopes and estimates a single equation for all crosssection and time-series. Because there are no spatial or temporal effects in constant
coefficient models, the analyst can pool the data to run a normal ordinary least square
(OLS) regression (Yaffee, 2003). For this reason the constant coefficients model is also
called the pooled regression model. [Eq (1)] mathematically represents this constant
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coefficients model (i.e., OLS). However, such a strong assumption that neither spatial nor
temporal effects are significant is rare.
The fixed effects model assumes that each cross-section unit has a unique intercept
which remains the same for all years, and each time series has its own intercept which
remains constant across units. The fixed effects model has the same slopes and constant
variance (error term) but intercepts differ across cross-sectional units or over time (Park,
2005). The fixed effects regression controls for the effects of omitted variables (i.e., error
term) which either differ across units or over time. The changes in the variables across
units or over time thus can be used to estimate the effects of independent variables on the
dependent variable. Conceptually, the fixed effects model is equivalent to creating a set
of dummy variables for each unit to control for differences among units or a group of
time dummy variables to control for differences over time. Thus, the fixed effects models
use an OLS estimation method, also known as the least-squares dummy variable models.
Mathematically, fixed effects models can be written as [Eq (2)] with unit effects, or as
[Eq (3)] with time effects.
N

(2)
1=1

y =A +

7=1

+
;=1

(3)
1=1

Where
Y : firm performance (FP);

...Xg : liquidity (L), solvency (S), activity (A), growth (G), profitability (P), dividend
payout (D), business diversification (BD), geographical diversification (GD), log of total
assets (SIZE);
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po: constant;
pi- Po: coefficient;
Yj or y, : coefficient;
Wj : unit effects dummy variables;

Z, : time effects dummy variables;
T: the number of years;
N: the number of firms; and,
E: e r r o r t e r m .

The drawback of the fixed effects model is that it may use too many dummy variables,
which can lower the statistical power and yield multicollinearity problems (Yaffee,
2003).
The random effects regression model estimates variance components (error term) for
units or time periods with assumptions of the same intercept and slopes (Park, 2005).
Therefore, it is also called error component model. This model is estimated by either
generalized least squares (GLS) when the variance structure is known, or feasible
generalized least squares (FGLS) when the variance matrix is unknown (Wooldridge,
2002). The random effects model can be used to mitigate the potential heteroscedasticity
problem which might be associated with the OLS. In fact, weight-least squares (WLS), as
part of GLS/FGLS models, is often used to solve heteroscedasticity problem. The random
effects models provide greater statistical power and parsimony, but they rely on a
different assumption that the error term is not correlated with the independent variables
(Yaffee, 2003). Otherwise, the random effects model will be biased even it is efficient.
Conceptually, fixed effects model examines how the unit and/or time affect the intercept.
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assuming the constant slopes and variance across the units (Park, 2005). The random
effects model analyzes error variance structures affected by the unit and/or time,
assuming the same slopes and intercept (Park, 2005). Random effects models can be
mathematically expressed as [Eq (4)] for unit effects, and as [Eq (5)] for time effects.
9

Y = pQ + ^ p , X i + s whereas e = f^^+e(\ = 1,...,N)

(4)

<=i

Y =y#o

P i^ i + ^ whereas £ = /i, + e (t = 1,..., T)

(5)

1=1

where
Y : firm performance (FP);

X,...Yg : liquidity (L), solvency (S), activity (A), growth (G), profitability (P), dividend
payout (D), business diversification (BD), geographical diversification (GD), log of total
assets (SIZE), respectively;
Po: constant;
Pi- pg: coefficient;
e: general total error term;
//, or

: unobservable unit effects or time effects; and,

e : the remainder error term.

Statistically, the fixed effects model is always a good way to start with panel data,
since it will provide consistent results, but it may not be the most efficient model to use
(Panel Data, 2006). The random effects model, on the other hand, will generate better Pvalues as it is a more efficient way to estimate the model (Panel Data, 2006). Thus, the
random effects model is preferred given these statistical justifications. Practically,
dummy variables play different roles in fixed effects and random effects models. It is a
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fixed effects model if they are treated as a part of the intercept. The random effects model
considers dummy variables as an error term (Park, 2005). Park (2005) summarizes the
differences between fixed effects and random effects models in Table 1.

Table 1
Fixed Effects and Random Effects M odels

Fixed Effects Model

Random Effects Model

Functional form*

Yu ={cc + ^ i) + X l,p + v ,

y,t = a + K P + (Fi + L ,)

Intercepts

Varying across groups
and/or time

Error variances

Constant

Constant
Varying across groups
and/or time

Slopes

Constant

Constant

Hypothesis test for model
appropriateness over OLS

Incremental F test

Breusch-Pagan LM test

Note. * v„ ~ I1D(0,S^ ) ; IID stands for independent identically distributed: adapted from

Park (2005).

Several tests will be employed to determine which model is most appropriate and the
test flows are illustrated in Figure 2. Pooled OLS regression will be run first. From two
separated perspectives (i.e., unit effects and time effects), the Hausman Specification Test
will be performed to determine which model, fixed effects or random effects is
appropriate under either unit effects or time effects conditions. Fixed effects and random
effects models analyses, as well as their significance tests (i.e., incremental F test and the
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Breusch and Pagan LM test) will then be conducted at the end. The results of appropriate
models will be presented and discussed under both unit- and time-effects viewpoints.

Unit
Effects

Fixed Effects

-► Incremental F Test

Random Effects

-► B-P LM Test

Fixed Effects

-► Incremental F Test

Random Effects

-> B-P LM Test

Hausman
Test
OLS
Hausman
Test
Time
Effects

Figure 2. Model test procedures flow chart.

An incremental F test (a simple Chow test), based on loss of goodness-of fit is used to
determine whether a fixed effects model is better than an OLS regression (Park, 2005;
Baltagi, 2005). It tests the significance of these dummy variables, i.e.,
Hq : fj.^= fi 2 = ... =

= 0 or //() : r, = ^2 =... = r,_, = 0 (Baltagi, 2005). If the null

hypothesis is rejected, the fixed effects model is preferred. The Breusch-Pagan Lagrange
Multiplier (LM) test (Breusch & Pagan, 1980) can check whether the random effects
model performs better than OLS regression (Park, 2005). The LM is distributed as chisquare with one degree of freedom with its null hypothesis being that cross-sectional
variance components are zero (Park, 2005). If the null hypothesis is not rejected, the
normal OLS is appropriate. The Hausman specification test (Hausman, 1978) is usually
used to check whether fixed effect or random effects models are most appropriate. In
particular, it checks a tradeoff between a more efficient model (random effects) and a less
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efficient but more consistent model (fixed effects) to ensure that efficient model can
produce consistent results (Park, 2005). The Hausman test investigates the null
hypothesis that the coefficients estimated by the efficient effects estimator are the same
as the ones estimated by the consistent fixed effects estimator. A significant P-value will
suggest a fixed effects model, whereas an insignificant P-value indicates it is safe to use a
random effects model.
Assumptions Checking
Before data analysis, data screening and assumption checks are necessary for any
analysis using inferential statistics. Most statistics are built on certain ideal assumptions
and limitations. After outliers are filtered out of the dataset, checking assumptions will
follow. Panel regression analysis follows assumptions similar to the normal multiple
regression technique. The fixed effects model also applies the same OLS estimation as
the only difference between the normal multiple regression and the fixed effects model is
that the dummies are added in the fixed effects model to capture the differences among
the cross-sectional units or the time dynamics. The random effects model differs from the
normal multiple regression in the assumptions that it does not have the requirement of
homoscedasticity but the correlations between the error term and independent variables
are not statistically significantly different from 0 (Park, 2005). In other words, the error
term and independent variables are assumed to be truly independent.
Normality
The underlying assumption of multiple regression analysis is the multivariate
normality. Multivariate normality is the assumption that all variables and all
combinations of the variables are normally distributed. Multivariate normality is difficult
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to test and many statistical software packages do not include such procedures. However
in regression, when the assumption is met the residuals are normally distributed, the
differences between predicted and actual scores (the errors) are symmetrically distributed
around a mean of zero and there is no pattern to the errors (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001).
Therefore, normality can be checked through the scatter plots of the predicted dependent
variable and actual residuals in regression analysis. As long as there is adequate sample
size, the normality assumption will not be a serious concern as the central limit theorem
will hold for a relatively large sample size (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1998).
Linearity
An implicit assumption of many statistical tests (including regression techniques)
based on correlation measures of association is linearity (Hair et al, 1998). If the “true”
relation is not linear, a linear mode may, but will not always, provide a reasonable
approximation. Linearity can be examined by inspecting scatter plots of actual residuals
versus the predicted dependent variable in regression analysis. If the linearity assumption
is violated, a transformation may be used to mitigate the problem.
Multicollinearity
Multicollinearity is a problem that occurs when variables are too highly correlated
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). Statistically, multicollinearity usually influences regression
results by inflating the standard errors and thereby creating a bias toward overestimating
the coefficients. Tolerance or the variance inflation factor (VIF) can be used to check for
multicollinearity. In general dropping some variables out of the analysis which may have
caused the multicollinearity can often resolve this issue.
Independence of the Error Term
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Traditional OLS regression assumes that the error term is independent. Panel data
usually have quite strong dependencies among errors by including the temporal
dimension in the data. As such, the OLS model is no longer the optimal method of
estimation because the standard errors are biased downward (Hsiao, 2003). In addition,
the fact that those current values of a certain variable might depend on the past values
also raises the potential problem of autocorrelation. If the errors have positive
autocorrelation, panel regression tends to underestimate the variability in the coefficient,
the standard errors will be smaller than they should be and F tests and the

of the

regression will be inflated. On the other hand, panel regression tends to overestimate the
coefficient’s variability for the negative autocorrelation, though negative autocorrelation
rarely occurs in the social sciences. The Wooldridge Wald test can be used to test for
autocorrelation in panel data models. The panel data with autocorrelation can be resolved
by first differencing to control for the autocorrelation effects on the residuals
(Wooldridge, 2002).
Homoscedasticity
Another important relevant assumption is homoscedasticity, the assumption that the
dependent variable has constant variance across the range of the independent variables.
When the variance of the error term changes across observations, the data are
heteroscedastic. Heteroscedasticity only affects the efficiency of estimating the regression
coefficient while these estimated coefficients remain unbiased (Frees, 2004). In the
context of panel data, the Breusch and Pagan (1980) test can be used to detect
heteroscedasticity for the fixed effects model, while the random effects model does not
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require such an assumption. A robust panel model with corrected (robust) standard errors
can be used to handle heteroscedasticity for the fixed effects model (Wooldridge, 2002).

Variables Selection
Dependent Variables
Firm performance is the dependent variable in the model and three different measures
of performance (i.e.. Proxy Q, Sharpe ratio, and Treynor ratio) were selected to use in this
study. Proxy Q measures firm performance on a value-oriented basis and all the
stakeholders o f the firm care about this value. The Sharpe ratio (S-Ratio) reflects firm
performance on a total risk-adjusted standard from the market point of view. The Treynor
ratio (T-Ratio) evaluates firm performance on a systematic risk-adjusted measure based
on the capital assets pricing model (CAPM). Each of these provides different
perspectives o f firm performance.
Independent Variables
Liquidity is measured by current ratio in this study. The current ratio conventionally
measures liquidity in the accounting and finance literature (Davis & Peles, 1993;
Horrigan, 1965; Petes & Schneller, 1989). The current ratio is defined as the relationship
of a firm’s current assets over current liabilities. Current assets include cash and other
assets that are to be converted to cash within a year, such as marketable securities, and
accounts receivable. Current liabilities cover any short-term financial obligations
expected to be paid within next 12 months, such as accounts payable, and notes payable.
Solvency is represented by debt ratio. The debt ratio is one of the most frequently
used and effective ratios to show the capital structure of a firm (Grossman & Hart, 1986;
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Harris & Raviv, 1990; Roenfeldt &Cooley, 1978; Zantout, 1997). Debt ratio equals total
debt dividing by total assets and reflects the percentage of firm’s total liabilities in its
assets. Total debts include both current liabilities and long-term liabilities. Total assets
include current assets, long-term assets, and other assets. A high value of the debt ratio
implies that the firm faces greater financial risks and obligations.
The assets turnover ratio is used in this study for activity. The asset turnover ratio
uses total sales as a numerator and average total assets as the denominator. It indicates
how efficiently a firm’s assets produce revenues and the volume of business generated by
the asset base (i.e., the flow of revenue through the asset pipeline). The asset turnover
ratio reflects how effectively or the productively the firm’s management is utilizing the
total assets, which implies the firm’s capital productivity. The assets turnover ratio is
frequently cited as a key activity ratio in financial/accounting research (Flouris &
Walker, 2005; Imhoff, Lipe, & Wright, 1997; Roenfeldt & Cooley; 1978).
Sales growth serves as the surrogate for firm’s growth in this study. Many other
authors also have used this variable in the literature as sales usually have a positive and
meaningful value to work as a base (Keats & Hitt, 1988, Roenfeldt & Cooley, 1978). It is
defined as the change in a firm's total sales of this observed year over the preceding year.
This measure suggests to the extent how well a firm's products and services are
welcomed by the market.
This study uses profit margin as a proxy for profitability. Another popular name for
profit margin is return on sales. It measures how profitable a firm’s sales are on a
percentage basis after all other expenses and taxes have been deducted. Capon, Farley,
and Hoenig (1990) found that return on sales is one of the most widely used profitability
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measures after reviewing 320 studies from 1921 to 1987 and employing meta-analysis to
summarize the literature on accounting performance to measure profit.
Dividend policy is modeled by a dichotomous variable. If there is no dividend for a
firm in a certain year, the value is zero. Otherwise, the value is one.
The size variable, measured by log of total assets, is also included in the model to
account for the potential bias due to different firm size. Following what have been done
in the previous studies by Hoskisson, Johnson, and Moesel (1994) or Keats and Hitt
(1988), logarithmic transformation of total assets can significantly reduce the impact of
outliers and make data more normally distributed (Hair et al, 1998; Tabachnick & Fidell,
2001 ).

Business diversification and geographic diversification, respectively, are also
modeled by dichotomous variables. Zero represents no diversification at all and one
represents the opposite. According to Statement of Financial Accounting Standards
(SFAS) No. 14 (Financial Accounting Standards Board [FASB], 1976), business segment
data are reported when an industry is more than 10 percent of a firm’s revenues as part of
the disclosure requirements. Thus, whenever there are more than two business segments
for the firm, the value o f business diversification will be coded as one. Likewise, SFAS
No. 14 has also required a firm to disclose geographic segment data if the foreign sales
take up more than 10 percent of its total revenue.

Sample and Data
This study includes all active publicly traded hospitality firms with available data
from both Standard & Poor’s COMPUSTAT and Center for Research in Security Prices
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(CRSP) databases between 2000 and 2004. The sample firm names and associated tickers
were first collected through the primary North American Industry Classification System
(NACIS) codes in COMPUSTAT. In particular, the hotel sector consists of the firms with
NACIS code number 721110 (Hotels & Motels) and 721120 (Casino Hotels), whereas
the restaurant sector comprises of these under NACIS code number 722110 (Full-service
Restaurants) and 722211 (Limited-service Restaurants). COMPUSTAT has all necessary
information to construct the firm financial factors and Proxy Q for this study. A
collection of financial variables obtained from COMPUSTAT is listed in Table 2. Table 3
elaborates how the variables included in the proposed model are computed using
COMPUSTAT data.
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Table 2
Variables O btainedfrom COMPUSTAT between 2000-2004

Variable

Description

DATA4

Current Assets (MM$)

DATA 5

Current Liability (MM$)

DATA6

Total Assets (MM$)

DATA9

Long-term Debt (MM$)

DATAI 2

Net Sales (MM$)

DATA21

Common Dividend (MM$)

DATA24

Year-end Stock Close Price ($&C)

DATA25

Common Shares Outstanding (MM)

DATA34

Debt in Current Liabilities (MM$)

DATA60

Total Common Equity (MM$)

DATA74

Deferred Taxes on Balance Sheet (MM$)

DATAI 72

Net Income (MM$)

STYPE

Segment Type (char)

SNAME

Segment Name (char)

SALE

Net Sales (MM$) Per Segment

Note. MM is millions; MM$ is millions of dollars; $&C is dollars and cents; char stands

for characters rather than numbers.
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Table 3
Computation o f the Variables in the M odel

Construct

Computation with the data from COMPUSTAT

Proxy Q

(DATA6 + (DATA24 x DATA25) - (DATA60 + DATA74))
DATA6

Liquidity

DATA4
DATA5

Solvency

(DATA9 + DATA34)
DATA6

Activity

2 XDATAI 2
(Current (DATA6) + Previous (DATA6))

Growth

Current (DATA6)
Previous (DATA6)

Profitability

DATAI 72
DATA12

Dividend

If DATA21>, D=0; Else, D=1

Business Diversification

If (STYPE=BUSSEG and SALE>0), BD=1 ; Else, BD=0

Geographic Diversification

If (STYPE=GEOSEG and SALE>0), GD=1 ; Else, GD=0

Next, the firm tickers identified in the first step were used to extract the data of each
firm’s stock returns and Betas in the CRSP database. The 1 month Treasury Bill return
was treated as a proxy for risk-free return and was also acquired from the CRSP. The data
obtained from CRSP (i.e.. Beta, 1 month T-bill return, firm monthly return and standard
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deviation) were used to compute the Treynor ratio (T-Ratio) and Sharpe ratios (S-Ratio)
according to the formulas illustrated in Chapter 2.
This study tested the relationship between performance and firm-wise factors for the
most recent 5-year period with publicly available data, namely 2000 to 2004. This time
span is worthwhile to investigate as 2000 starts the new millennium. Therefore, a panel
(longitudinal) sample o f hospitality firms within the time frame of 2000-2004 was used
for empirical analysis. There were some missing and erroneous data (such as a blank
value for assets) for certain firms in some years. These observations were pre-screened
and removed from the dataset by list-wise deletion (i.e., the whole observation is
removed if there is any missing value) to perform the analysis.

Summary
A research design with a proposed model between firm-wise financial factors and
firm performance was presented with detailed information on statistical analysis
techniques and related assumptions, as well as data collection, and variable selections.
The results will be shown and discussed in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 4

FINDINGS OF THE STUDY
The first section of this chapter checks the underlying assumptions of statistical
analysis. The second section summarizes the descriptive statistics of all variables used in
this study, along with bivariate correlation matrixes. The outcomes of relevant data
analysis are presented in Section Three, including relevant tests and panel regression
analyses for the two hospitality sectors. Hypotheses testing and summary are provided at
the end of the chapter. STATA 9.0 is employed to perform all analyses.

Assumptions Checking
Autocorrelation of each panel data model was tested by Wooldridge (2002) Wald test
and the results are listed in Table 4. In the restaurant sector, the autocorrelation problem
was raised for the Proxy Q from the perspective of unit effects (i.e., firm differences).
Likewise, the Proxy Q and S-Ratio in the hotel sector also had such autocorrelation
problems under unit effects. Autoregressive models with 1 lag period - AR (1) were used
to mitigate these problems.
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Table 4 .
Wooldridge W ald Test f o r Autocorrelation

Sector

DV

Effects

Test Results

Decision

Unit

F(i,52rl5.405**

AR(l)

Time

F(i ,4)=0.307

No concern

Unit

F(i,52)=0.007

No concern

Time

F(i.4)=1.370

No concern

Unit

F(i,52)=0.412

No concern

Time

F(i,4)=2.541

No concern

Unit

F(i^)=6.072**

AR(1)

Time

F(i,4r0.962

No concern

Unit

F(,.29)=4.751**

AR(l)

Time

F(i.4)=2.653

No concern

Unit

F(i,29)“ L087

No concern

Time

F(,,4)=1.121

No concern

Proxy Q

n *
*
Restaurant

S-Ratio

T-Ratio

Proxy Q

TT I
Hotel

S-Ratio

T-Ratio

Note. ** represents the 0.05 significance level.

Residual scatterplots of predicted scores of the dependent variable and errors of
prediction of OLS regressions were employed to check the assumptions of normality,
linearity, and homoscadesticity for all the equations in both the restaurant and hotel sector
as suggested by Tabachnick and Fidell (2001). Six OLS equations were initially run for
the three performance measures in both sectors. Additionally, three AR(1) OLS models
were performed to control for the potential autocorrelation problems identified previously
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in the Proxy Q in both the restaurant and hotel sector and the Sharpe ratio in the hotel
sector (see Table 4). A total of nine graphs (Figures 3-11) are generated for checking the
assumptions of normality, linearity and homoscedasticity. There are no serious issues for
the assumptions of normality and linearity as all graphs are scattered without curve
shapes. However, Figure 3 (Proxy Q for Restaurant Firms) and Figure 6 (Proxy Q for
Hotel Firms) raise some concerns over heteroscadesticity because the distributions of the
scatterplots are not random according to Tabachnick and Fidell (2001). As mentioned in
Chapter 3, using robust standard errors (robust model) can mitigate the heteroscadesticity
problem for the fixed effects model. On the other hand, it will not be a problem for the
random effects model in this matter as the random effects model does not require such an
assumption. In addition, multicollinearity of these models was assessed through variance
inflation factor (VIF). The values of VIF range from 1.060-2.634 for restaurant firms and
1.129-1.854 for hotel firms, which implies no problems in this regard.
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Figure 3. Residual scatterplot of proxy Q for restaurant firms.
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Figure 4. Residual scatterplot o f S-Ratio for restaurant firms.
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Figure 5. Residual scatterplot of T-Ratio for restaurant firms.
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Figure 6. Residual scatterplot of proxy Q for hotel firms.
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Figure 7. Residual scatterplot of S-Ratio for hotel firms.
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Figure 8. Residual scatterplot of T-Ratio for hotel firms.
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Figure 10. Residual scatterplot of proxy Q AR (1) for hotel firms.
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Figure 11. Residual scatterplot o f S-Ratio AR (1) for hotel firms.

Descriptive Statistics
The Restaurant Sector
Observations of ninety-two restaurant firms were first obtained by their NAICS codes
(i.e., 722110 and 722211) from 2000 through 2004. Firms with erroneous and inadequate
data and lack o f stock return information were dropped. A total of 256 observations
(firm/year) from 56 restaurant firms with no missing values were retained for the data
analysis in this study. Descriptive statistics of all continuous variables are summarized in
Table 5. Table 6 shows the frequency and percentages of the dichotomous variables.
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Table 5
Descriptive Statistics f o r the Restaurant Sector

Variable

N

Mean

Std. Dev.

Max

Min

Liquidity

256

0.923

0.543

3.597

0.234

Solvency

256

0.213

0.153

0.711

0.000

Activity

256

1.690

0.531

3.835

0.663

Growth

256

0.118

0.150

1.103

-0.259

Profitability

256

0.032

0.058

0.139

-0.417

Size

256

19.243

1.723

24.050

15.134

Proxy Q

256

1.816

1.070

7.573

0.470

S-Ratio

256

1.990

3.515

11.369

-10.705

T-Ratio

256

0.535

9.977

8.527

-6.957

Table 6
Frequency and Percentages o f the Dichotomous Variables o f the Restaurant Sector

Variable

Frequency (Observations)

Percentage

Dividend Payout

60

0.234

Business Diversification

57

0.223

Geographical Diversification

36

0.141

Liquidity (current ratio) ranged from 0.234 to 3.597, with a mean of 0.922. On
average, restaurant firms had slightly more current liabilities than current assets. With an
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average value o f solvency (debt ratio) at 0.213, the restaurant sector was considered a
lower leveraged business in general. Restaurant firms relied more on equity and less on
debt. The minimum activity ratio (total asset turnover) was 0.663 and the maximum was
3.835. The average activity ratio of 1.690 showed that restaurant firms’ generated
approximated 70 percent more sales than assets, indicating their reasonable management
effectiveness and efficiency. Restaurant firms grew at 11.8 percent annually from 2000 to
2004 in terms o f sales, which was fairly strong. Profitability was 3.2 percent yearly. The
Proxy Q fell between 0.470 and 7.573 with an average of 1.816. This implies that
restaurant firms were approximately worth more than the cost to rebuild them. The mean
of the Sharpe ratio and the Treynor ratio was 1.990 and 0.535, respectively. There were
relative small percentages of restaurant firms that paid out dividend, implemented
significant business diversification and/or geographical diversification.
The Hotel Sector
Fifty-two hotel (including casino hotel) firms were initially identified through their
NACIS code numbers (i.e., 721110 and 721120). 151 observations (firm/year) from 32
hotels panel data were retained in this study between 2000 and 2004 after incomplete
and inaccurate accounting data and incomplete stock returns information were excluded
The descriptive statistics of all continuous variables are presented in Table 7. Table 8
shows the frequencies and percentages of the dichotomous variables.
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Table 7
D escriptive Statistics f o r the H otel Sector

Variable

N

Mean

Std. Dev.

Max

Min

Liquidity

151

1.205

0.925

5.995

0.253

Solvency

151

0.466

0.185

0.950

0.102

Activity

151

0.591

0.558

4.734

0.087

Growth

151

0.056

0.252

1.317

-0.783

Profitability

151

0.003

0.167

0.300

-1.000

Size

151

20.843

1.608

23.261

17.618

Proxy Q

151

1.194

0.517

3.670

0.514

S-Ratio

151

2.341

4.203

21.896

-7.472

T-Ratio

151

0.282

1.405

5.908

-7.796

Table 8
Frequency and Percentages o f the Dichotomous Variables o f the H otel Sector

Variable

Frequency (Observations)

Percentage

Dividend Payout

48

0.318

Business Diversification

77

0.510

Geographical Diversification

44

0.291

The hotel sector had an average liquidity (current ratio) value of 1.205, with a
maximum of 5.995 and a minimum of 0.253. Hotel firms had relative more current assets
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than current liabilities. The hotel sector was slightly more liquid than the restaurant
counterpart. The mean value of solvency for hotel firms was 0.466, indicating hotels were
approximately equally financed through both equity and debt. The hotel sector was
leveraged relatively heavily compared to the restaurant sector. The activity ratio of hotel
firms averaged at 0.591 and lagged far behind restaurant firms, reflecting mediocre
management effectiveness and efficiency in using available assets to generate adequate
revenues. The growth rate of hotel firms was 5.6 percent annually, which was moderate.
Hotel firms had an extremely low annualized return of 0.3 percent during the 5-year
period as compared with restaurant firms’ 3.2 percent annual profitability rate. The Proxy
Q ranged from 0.514 to 3.670 with an average of 1.194. Hotels firms were worth slightly
more than their rebuilt costs on average. The mean of the Sharpe ratio and Treynor ratio
was 2.341 and 0.282, respectively. 31.8 % of hotel firm/year observations had dividend
payouts. Half o f the hotels had significant business diversifications and approximately
30% of hotel firms had geographical diversifications. Hotels had more dividend payouts,
business and geographical diversifications than restaurants from 2000 through 2004.

Correlation Matrix
Table 9 contains the correlation matrix of the variables for the restaurant sector. The
correlation coefficients indicated low to moderate pair-wise correlation among these
variables. The correlation matrix of the variables for the hotel sector is presented in Table
10. No numbers arouse attention because bivariate correlation coefficients range from 0.338 to 0.532, which indicate low to moderate correlations among these variables.
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L
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S

A

G

P

Size

D

BD

GD

Proxy Q

S-Ratio

5
C
Q3"

L

1.000

i3

S

-0.381**

1.000

A

-0.118**

-0.077

1.000

G

0.223**

-0.166**

0.081*

1.000

P

-0.101*

-0.110**

-0.169**

0.157**

1.000

Size

-0.220**

0.066

-0.392**

-0.035

0.442**

1.000

D

-0.127**

-0.079

-0.247**

-0.065

0.254**

0.505**

1.000

BD

0.034

0.074

0.064

-0.006

-0.031

0.076

0.103**

1.000

GD

-0.004

0.122**

0.007

-0.039

0.163**

0.504**

0.174**

0.162**

1.000

Proxy Q

0.210**

-0.372**

0.013

0.319**

0.332**

0.329**

0.018

0.171**

0.219**

1.000

S-Ratio

0.085*

-0.155**

-0.027

0.091*

0.201**

0.094*

0.061

-0.018

0.023

0.364**

1.000

T-Ratio

0.102*

-0.074

-0.090*

0.040

0.111**

0.022

0.000

0.024

0.023

0.215**

0.510**

T-Ratio
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P: profitability. Size: log of total assets, D: dividend payout, BD: business diversification, GD: geographical diversification.
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Size

D
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Proxy Q

S-Ratio

L

1.000

S

-0.306**

1.000

A

-0.110*

-0.063

1.000

G

-0.005

0.023

0.198**

1.000

P

0.183**

-0.103

0.095

0.219**

1.000

Size

-0.166**

0.045

-0.206**

0.074

0.014

1.000

D

0.152**

-0.141**

-0.090

-0.078

0.149**

0.345**

1.000

BD

0.131*

-0.338**

0.028

-0.109*

-0.215**

-0.039

0.385**

1.000

GD

0.100

-0.230**

0.204**

-0.041

0.042

0.099

0.532**

0.512**

1.000

Proxy Q

0.426**

-0.191**

0.088

0.163**

0.371**

0.102

0.345**

-0.079

0.155**

1.000

S-Ratio

0.037

-0.034

-0.068

0.131*

0.185**

0.156**

0.158**

-0.251**

-0.096

0.385**

1.000

T-Ratio

0.063

-0.036

0.160**

0.160**

0.203**

0.000

-0.032

-0.148**

-0.035

0.171**

0.455**
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Note. ** and * represents the 0.05 and 0.10 significance levels, respectively. L; liquidity, S: solvency. A: activity, G: growth,

P: profitability. Size: log of total assets, D: dividend payout, BD: business diversification, GD: geographical diversification

Panel Regression Results
Results o f the pooled OLS regression, as well as the fixed effects and random effects
models for both the restaurant and hotel sectors are presented in this section. Firm
performance is measured separately by three performance measures. The panel regression
equations are viewed from two perspectives (i.e., unit effects and time effects)
The Restaurant Sector
Proxy Q
Table 11 summarizes the results of the relationships under different perspectives
between firm-wise financial factors and firm performance measured by the Proxy Q
within the time span from 2000 to 2004 in the restaurant sector. Under the conditions that
there were no spatial or temporal differences among all restaurant observations
(firm/year), the OLS model showed significant findings. Liquidity, activity ratio, sales
growth, profitability demonstrated significant and positive relations with firm
performance. In other words, higher percentages of liquidity, activity ratio, sales growth
and profitability helped restaurant firms gain better value. Solvency, in converse, had a
significantly negative effect on restaurant firm performance. Borrowing more debt may
destroy restaurant firm value from 2000 to 2004. The controlling variable size was found
to be a significant positive contributor to restaurant performance. Larger restaurants
performed better. The negative sign of the dichotomous dividend variable indicated that
restaurants without paying dividends outperformed those distributing dividends during
this period. On the other hand, restaurants with more business segments had better
performance compared to those with only restaurant business. There was no statistically
significant difference in restaurant firm performance with respect to the geographical
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diversification strategy. Whether the restaurant firm generated significant foreign sales or
not had few impacts on its performance. Although the results of the pooled OLS model
showed a good model fit with an R-square of 0.451, the underlying assumption that all
restaurants in each year were homogeneous could be too stringent. Therefore, further
analyses following the steps described in Chapter 3 resumed (see Figure 2).
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Table 11
Results o f Regression with Proxy Q as the Dependent Variable fo r the Restaurant Sector
OLS
L
S
A
G
P
Size
D
BD
GD
Constant
R"(Adj-R^)
Overall
Significance
Statistics
Hausman
Test
B-P LM Test
Incremental
F Test

FE (ARl)
Unit Effects
0.178
(1.54)
-2.273**
(-3.10)
0.606*
(1.69)
0.317
(0.68)
-0.055
(-0.07)
-0.109
(-0.36)
0.115
(0.46)
-0.447
(-0.80)
-0.320
(-0.51)
3.372
(0.82)
0.902 (0.854)

0.274**
(2.38)
-2.262**
(-5.92)
0.257**
(2.22)
1.444**
(4.04)
2.890**
(2.86)
0.292**
(6.13)
-0.615**
(-4.34)
0.447**
(L 5 0
0.055
(0.30)
-4.228**
(-4.07)
0.451 (0.431)

RE (ARl)
Unit Effects
0.178*
(1.95)
-2.077**
(-4.78)
0.353**
(2.30)
0.599**
(2.17)
0.544
(0.75)
0.265**
(4.02)
-0.217
(-1.43)
0.301*
(1.65)
0.103
(0.38)
-3.680**
(-2.66)
0.402

F p . 2 4 0 = 2 2 .4 8 * *

Chf(,o)=74.05**

F(9,135)=3.17**

Chi^(6)=17.72**
Chf(i)= 159.79**

RE
Time Effects
0.274**
(2.38)
-2.262**
(-5.92)
0.257**
(2.22)
1.444**
(4.04)
2.890**
(2.86)
0.292**
(6.13)
-0.615**
(-4.34)
0.447**
(3.58)
0.055
(0.30)
-4.228**
(-4.07)
0.451

FE (Robust)
Time Effects
0.256**
(2.23)
-2.238**
(-5.90)
0.238**
(2.06)
1.405**
(3.90)
3.124**
(3.10)
0.279**
(5.84)
-0.619**
G4 38)
0.463**
(3.73)
0.073
(0.40)
-3.940**
(-.379)
0.468 (0.440)

Chf(9)=202.29** F(9,242)=22.18**

Chi^Q'=3.55
Chf(i)=0.70

F(55..35)=5.51**

F(4,242)=1.91

Note. ** and * represents the 0.05 and 0.10 significance levels, respectively. L: liquidity,

S: solvency. A: activity, G: growth, P: profitability. Size: log of total assets, D: dividend
payout, BD: business diversification, GD: geographical diversification.

The perspective of unit effects (i.e., fimi differences) model stated that each
restaurant firm had different characteristics, such as personnel, corporate culture.

79

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

location, and available resources. Those variables were either omitted or unobservable.
The variations in each year were assumed to be invariant. AR (1) models were performed
due to the autocorrelation problem identified by the Wooldridge Wald test in Table 4.
The significant result of the Hausman specification test and the incremental F test implied
that the fixed effects model would be more appropriate than both the random effects and
OLS model (see Table 11). The results of the fixed effects model with AR (1) term
indicated that two independent variables were significant determinants for restaurant
performance. Solvency had an inverse relationship with firm performance. Less debt
could evidently enhance restaurant firm value. The positive association between activity
ratio and performance reflected that higher management effectiveness and efficiency did
increase restaurant firm performance. All other firm-specific financial factors had
inconclusive effects on restaurant firm performance in this model. The R-squared value
changed to 0.902 after including the firm difference effects.
Taking into consideration of time effects instead of unit effects, the model was
reevaluated without autoregressive term due to the insignificant Wooldridge Wald test in
Table 4. The time effects model considered that each year had a significant and different
dynamic owing to the changes of taste, technology, economy, business cycle and so forth.
The differences between firms, however, were considered homogenous. The fixed effects
model was run by a robust model using the robust standard error as the assumption of
homoscedasticity was violated, which was detected by Figure 3. The result of the
Hausman test indicated the random effects model would be more appropriate while the
Breusch and Pagan LM test suggested the OLS model would be as efficient as the
random effects model. Hence, the results under the perspective of time effects were same
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as those of the OLS model. Interpretations of the time effects model were the same with
those of the OLS model (see Table 11).
Sharpe Ratio
Table 12 provides the results of the relationships of different models between firmwise financial factors and restaurant firm performance measured by the Sharpe ratio from
2000 to 2004. The OLS model considered there were no significant differences both
across firms and over time. The R-square value was just 0.065. The profitability ratio was
the only significant determinant on the Sharpe ratio after reviewing the results in Table
12. All other independent variables failed to produce statistically significant impacts on
restaurant firm performance after the total risk was taken into account.
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Table 12
Results o f Regression with Sharpe Ratio as the Dependent Variable fo r the Restaurant
Sector
OLS
L
S
A
G
P
Size
D
BD
GD
Constant
R"(Adj-R^)
Overall
Significance
Statistics
Hausman
Test
B-P LM Test
Incremental
F Test

0.487
(0.99)
-2.315
(-1.41)
0.181
(0.36)
0.703
(0.46)
10.476**
(2.42)
0.133
(0.65)
-0.003
(0.00)
-0.089
(-0.17)
-0.226
(-0.29)
-1.194
(-0.27)
0.065 (0.030)

RE
Unit Effects
0.487
(0.99)
-2.315
(-1.41)
0.181
(0.36)
0.703
(0.46)
10.476**
(2.42)
0.133
(0.65)
-0.003
(0.00)
-0.089
(-0.17)
-0.226
(-0.29)
-1.194
(-0.27)
0.065

FE
Unit Effects
0.345
(0.43)
-11.613**
(-2.68)
1.147
(0.66)
0.446
(0.19)
8.148
(1.25)
-0.252
(-0.20)
-1.013
(-0.67)
0.995
(0.43)
2.179
(0.61)
6.462
(0.26)
0.232 (-0.026)

RE
Time Effects
0.487
(0.99)
-2.315
(-1.41)
0.181
(0.36)
0.703
(0.46)
10.476**
(2.42)
0.133
(0.65)
-0.003
(0.00)
-0.089
(-0.17)
-0.226
(-0.29)
-1.194
(-0.27)
0.065

FE
Time Effects
0.523
(1.13)
-1.834
(-1.20)
0.181
(0.39)
0.746
(0.52)
11.262**
(2.78)
0.091
(0.47)
0.134
(0.24)
-0.064
(-0.13)
-0.175
(-0.24)
-0.592
(-0.14)
0.206 (0.164)

F(9,246)=1.89*

Chi^(9fl6.97**

F(9,191)=1.70*

ChiV)=16.97**

F(9.242)=2.14**

Chi"(6],=6.96

Chi'(«):=0.85
ChF(,)=126.01**

ChF(,)=4.81**

F(55,190=0.76

F(4.242)=10.82**

Note. ** and * represents the 0.05 and 0.10 significance levels, respectively. L: liquidity,

S: solvency. A: activity, G: growth, P: profitability. Size: log of total assets, D: dividend
payout, BD: business diversification, GD: geographical diversification.
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The Hausman test implied the random effects models were more appropriate from the
perspective o f either unit effects or time effects. The Breusch and Pagan LM tests
suggested the random effects models were better than the OLS model under both effects
as well. In fact, the OLS model and these two random effects models under either unit or
time effects had the same coefficient values and the significance levels. Such facts may
suggest that the unit effects and time effects for the restaurant sector, if any, are minimal
and can be omitted when the firm performance was measured by the Sharpe ratio. Hence,
the results had same explanations as those of the OLS model for restaurant firms (see
Table 12).
Treynor Ratio
Surprisingly enough, results of the relationships between firm-wise financial factors
and firm performance measured by the Treynor ratio were overall insignificant for all
appropriate models (see Table 13). It should be noted that some individual factors had
significant impacts on firm performance. However, their effects should not be considered
as the whole models were statistically insignificant. The possible reasons could be many,
such as the impacts of unsystematic risk in each firm, the validity of CAPM model, the
reliability and accuracy o f measuring beta, and the model fit. These problems may
require further investigations.
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Table 13
Results o f Regression with Treynor Ratio as the Dependent Variable fo r the Restaurant
Sector
OLS
L
S
A
G
P
Size
D
BD
GD
Constant
R\Adj.R")
Overall
Significance
Statistics
Hausman
Test
B-P LM Test
Incremental
F Test

0.216
(0.83)
-0.582
(-0.67)
-0.347
(-1.32)
0.045
(0.06)
3.935*
(1.72)
-0.067
(-0.62)
-0.132
(-0.41)
0.161
(0.57)
0.216
(0.52)
2.175
(0.92)
.0.034 (-0.002)

RE
Unit Effects
0.236
(0.88)
-0.598
(-0.65)
-0.306
(-1.09)
-0.039
(-0.05)
4.003*
(1.72)
-0.069
(-0.60)
-0.122
(-0.36)
0.170
(0.56)
0.210
(0.47)
2.125
(0.85)
0.034

F(9.246)=0.95

ChF(9)=7.58

FE
Unit Effects
0.634
(1.60)
-0.263
(-0.12)
0.974
(1.14)
-1.004
(-0.85)
3.791
(1.18)
-1.224*
(-2.00)
0.135
(0.18)
2.835*
(2.48)
0.472
(0.27)
21.193*
(1 7 0
0.309 (0.077)

F(9,i91)=1.78*

Chi'■{6)=8.17

RE
Time Effects
0.216
(0.83)
-0.582
(-0.67)
-0.347
(-1.32)
0.045
(0.06)
3.935*
(1.72)
-0.067
(-0.62)
-0.132
(-0.41)
0.161
(0.57)
0.216
(0.52)
2.175
(0.92)
0.034

FE
Time Effects
0.267
(1.04)
-0.491
(-0.58)
-0.367
(-1.41)
-0.183
(-0.23)
3.647
(1.61)
-0.059
(-0.55)
-0.163
(-0.52)
0.183
(0.66)
0.225
(0.55)
2.017
(0.86)
0.084 (0.035)

Chi^(9)=8.57

F(9,242)=1.01

C h iV =93.41**
ChP(,)=7.19**

ChF(,)=0.44

F(55,191)=1.38

F(4.242)=3.31**

Note. ** and * represents the 0.05 and 0.10 significance levels, respectively. L: liquidity,

S: solvency. A: activity, G: growth, P: profitability. Size: log of total assets, D: dividend
payout, BD: business diversification, GD: geographical diversification.

84

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The Hotel Sector
Proxy Q
The outcomes of the relationships of different models between firm-wise financial
factors and firm performance measured by the Proxy Q fi-om 2000 to 2004 in the hotel
sector are shown in Table 14. The OLS model assumed that firm and time differences
among all hotel observations (firm/year) were the same. The R-squared value of the OLS
model was 0.410. Liquidity, activity ratio, and profitability presented significant and
positive relations with firm performance. Put it in another way, higher percentages of
liquidity, activity ratio and profitability could contribute to better hotel firm performance.
Dividend variable had a significant and positive coefficient, suggesting that it was better
for hotels to distribute their dividend to enhance firm value. In contrast to the findings in
the restaurant sector, business diversification would significantly give rise to weak hotel
performance. All other firm-specific financial factors, such as solvency, sales growth and
so on did not generate significant results. It is necessary to continue further analyses with
unit effects and time effects models to go beyond the OLS model assumptions.
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Table 14
Results o f Regression with Proxy Q as the Dependent Variable fo r the Hotel Sector

0.210**
(5.20)
-0.261
(-1.28)
0.128*
(1.91)
0.212
(1.50)
0.460**
(2.03)
0.018
(0.75)
0.386**
(3.96)
-0.264**
(-2.99)
0.006
(0.06)
0.607
(1.12)
0.410(0.372)

RE(AR1)
Unit Effects
0.092**
(2.06)
-0.479*
(-1.72)
0.051
(0.64)
0.162
(1.45)
0.173
(0.84)
0.010
(0.28)
0.305**
(2.85)
-0.236**
frL9%
0.059
(0.40)
1.067
(1.30)
0.373

FE(ARl)
Unit Effects
0.020
(0.36)
-1.396**
(-2.24)
-0.105
(-0.78)
0.234*
(1.76)
-0.130
(-0.57)
0.862**
(3.30)
0.041
(0.31)
-0.216
(-0.93)
-0.720
(-1.22)
-15.919**
(-4.88)
0.773 (0.656)

RE
Time Effects
0.210**
(5.20)
-0.261
(-1.28)
0.128*
(1.91)
0.212
(1.50)
0.460**
(2.03)
0.018
(0.75)
0.386**
(3.96)
-0.264**
(-2.99)
0.006
(0.06)
0.607
(1.12)
0.410

FE (Robust)
Time Effects
0.202**
(5.15)
-0.176
(-0.88)
.125*
(1.91)
0.217
(1.52)
0.510**
(2.30)
0.020
(0.86)
0.330**
(3.42)
-0.219**
G253)
0.012
(0.13)
0.529
(1.01)
0.461 (0.410)

F(9,,41)=10.87**

ChP(,o)=31.90**

F(9,7,)=2.62**

Chi"(9)=97.86**

F(9,137)=9.84**

OLS
L
S
A
G
P
Size
D
BD
GD
Constant
R^(Adj-R")
Overall
Significance
Statistics
Hausman
Test
B-P LM Test
Incremental
F Test

C h iV =57.95**

Chi(6) =4.36
ChP(i)=6.31**

Chi\i)=25.94**

Fp,,79)=2.29**

F(4,,37)=3.27**

Note. ** and * represents the 0.05 and 0.10 significance levels, respectively. L: liquidity,

S: solvency. A: activity, G; growth, P: profitability. Size: log of total assets, D: dividend
payout, BD: business diversification, GD: geographical diversification.

Under the perspective o f unit effects that there were differences in each firm and no
difference over time, the model was rerun. The fixed effects model was favored over the
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random effects model according to the significant Hausman test. The significant
incremental F test suggested the fixed effects model was better than the OLS model. The
results of the fixed effects model after controlling for the autocorrelation effect-AR (1)suggested two independent variables (solvency and sales growth) and the control variable
size had significant impacts on hotel performance. Solvency produced negative effects on
firm performance. Borrowing more debt took its toll on hotel firm value. The
significantly positive association between sales growth and performance showed that
sales growth in the hotel could improve its firm value. Larger hotel firms in terms of total
assets performed better than their smaller counterparts. The remaining firm-specific
financial factors were found to have non-significant effects on hotel firm performance in
this model. The value of R-squared increased to 0.773 when the effects of firm
differences were incorporated.
Both the fixed effects model and random effects models with the perspective of time
effects were performed. The robust standard error was used in the fixed effects model as
the problem of heteroscedasticity was found in Figure 6. The insignificant Hausman test
under time effects indicated the random effects model was favored over the fixed effect
model while the significant Breusch and Pagan LM tests confirmed the random effects
model was better for the hotel sector as compared with the OLS model. The results of the
random effects model under time effects were the same as those of the OLS model (see
Table 14), so were the interpretations of the results.
Sharpe Ratio
Table 15 contains results of the relationships of various models between firm-wise
financial factors and firm performance measured by the Sharpe ratio from 2000 to 2004
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in the hotel sector. With the assumption of homogeneity both across firms and over time,
the results o f the OLS model showed that only dividend policy and business
diversification variables made significant differences on the total risk-adjusted hotel firm
performance. The R-squared value was 0.180. In particular, hotels which paid out
dividends over the 5-year period were perceived to be better than hotels which did not
pay dividends. Alternatively, more business diversifications were considered as a bad
strategy on hotel firm performance when the total risk was adjusted. The rest o f firm-wise
financial factors were statistically insignificant to hotel firm performance after controlling
the total risk.
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Table 15
Results o f Regression with Sharpe Ratio as the Dependent Variable fo r the Hotel Sector
OLS
L
S
A
G
P
Size
D
BD
GD
Constant
R"(Adj-R')
Overall
Significance
Statistics
Hausman
Test
B-P LM Test
Incremental
F Test

0.003
(0.01)
-3.014
(-1.54)
-0.241
(-0.38)
1.902
(1.41)
0.850
(0.39)
0.091
(0.40)
2.884**
(3.09)
-2.817**
(-3.33)
-1.100
(-1.16)
2.707
(0.52)
0.180(0.127)

RE(AR1)
Unit Effects
0.190
(0.43)
-2.910
(-1.22)
-0.159
(-0.22)
1.844
(1.39)
2.251
(0.98)
0.164
(0.56)
2.656**
(2.48)
-2.826**
(-2.76)
-0.970
(-0.82)
0.982
(0.15)
0.175

FE(AR1)
Unit Effects
0.503
(0.64)
-8.888
(-1.05)
-0.417
(-0.21)
4.637**
(2.36)
3.051
(0.92)
5.436
(1.56)
0.899
(0.48)
-3.147
(-0.98)
4.130
(0.86)
-105.097**
(-2.04)
0.369 (0.046)

RE
Time Effects
0.003
(0.01)
-3.014
(-1.54)
-0.241
(-0.38)
1.902
(1.41)
0.850
(0.39)
0.091
(0.40)
2.884**
(3.09)
-2.817**
G3.33)
-1.100
(-1.16)
2.707
(0.52)
0.180

FE
Time Effects
-0.081
(-0.25)
-1.076
(-0.66)
-0.311
(-0.59)
1.957*
(1.68)
1.614
(0.89)
0.131
(0.69)
1.881**
(2.39)
-1.932**
(-2.74)
-1.050
(-1.34)
0.976
(0.23)
0.460 (0.409)

F(9, i41)=3.43**

ChP(io)=25.38**

F(,.7,)=2.19**

ChP(9)=30.90**

F(9.,37)=3.22**

Chi"(6)= 12.76**

Chi"(Q:=3.26
ChP(,)=205.30**

ChF(i)=6.18**

F(31.79)=0.42

F(4.137)=17.81**

Note. ** and * represents the 0.05 and 0.10 significance levels, respectively. L; liquidity,

S: solvency. A: activity, G: growth, P: profitability. Size: log of total assets, D: dividend
payout, BD: business diversification, GD: geographical diversification.

The significant Hausman test implied the fixed effects model was more appropriate
than the random effects model from the perspective of unit effects (see Table 15). The
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significant incremental F test showed the fixed effects model was better than the OLS
model. The results of the fixed effects model with AR (1) suggested only sales growth
would make significant positive impacts on total risk-adjusted hotel firm performance
with an R-squared of 0.369. Hotels with positive sales growth exhibited healthy firm
performance on a total risk-adjusted basis.
The result of the Hausman test under time effects indicated the random effects model
was preferred (see Table 15). Although the significant Breusch and Pagan LM test
implied that the random effects model was favored over the OLS, the random effects
model had the same results as the OLS model. Thus, same interpretations with the OLS
model followed for hotel firms when the total risk was considered.
Treynor Ratio
Similar to the results in the restaurant sector, none of the appropriate models had an
overall significant test statistic as shown in Table 16. Therefore, no further discussions
would follow.
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Table 16
Results o f Regression with Treynor Ratio as the Dependent Variable fo r the Hotel Sector
OLS
L
S
A
G
P
Size
D
BD
GD
Constant
R"(Adj-R")
Overall
Significance
Statistics
Hausman
Test
B-P LM Test
Incremental
F Test

0.103
(0.76)
-0.336
(-0.49)
0.379*
(1.67)
0.485
(1.02)
1.059
(1.39)
0.029
(0.35)
0.007
(0.02)
-0.354
(-1.19)
-0.073
(-0.22)
-0.342
(-0.19)
0.089 (0.031)

RE
Unit Effeets
0.103
(0.76)
-0.336
(-0.49)
0.379*
(1.67)
0.485
(1.02)
1.059
(1.39)
0.029
(0.35)
0.007
(0.02)
-0.354
(-1.19)
-0.073
(-0.22)
-0.342
(-0.19)
0.089

FE
Unit Effects
0.145
(0.59)
-2.137
(-1.10)
0.768
(1.43)
0.535
(0.99)
1.891*
(1.77)
-0.127
(-0.15)
-0.052
(-0.09)
-0.049
(-0.06)
0.639
(0.38)
3.307
(0.19)
0.233 (-0.036)

RE
Time Effects
0.103
(0.76)
-0.336
(-0.49)
0.379*
(1.67)
0.485
(1.02)
1.059
(1.39)
0.029
(0.35)
0.007
(0.02)
-0.354
(-1.19)
-0.073
(-0.22)
-0.342
(-0.19)
0.089

FE
Time Effects
0.111
(0.83)
0.035
(0.05)
0.387*
(1.76)
0.541
(1.12)
1.189
(1.58)
0.038
(0.48)
-0.143
(-0.44)
-0.216
(-0.74)
-0.082
(-0.25)
-0.735
(-0.41)
0.167 (0.088)

F(9,i4i)-1 53

Chi^(9)=13.75

F(9, 111)=1.67

Chf(9)=13.75

F(9. 137)=1.58

Chi"(Q=4.55

Chi^(6)==5.31
Chf(i)=2.81

Chf(i)=5.57**

F(3i,iii)=0.67

F(4. 137)=3.20**

Note. ** and * represents the 0.05 and 0.10 significance levels, respectively. L: liquidity,

S: solvency. A: activity, G: growth, P: profitability. Size: log o f total assets, D: dividend
payout, BD: business diversification, GD: geographical diversification.
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Regression Results Summary
In the restaurant sector, solvency and activity ratio were the only significant factors to
the value-based firm performance when only firm differences were considered. When
only time effects model was taken into account, liquidity, sales growth, profitability, size,
dividend payout, and business diversification constructs were all significant determinants
of the Proxy Q besides previously identified solvency and activity factors. Alternatively,
profitability appeared to be the only significant contributor to the Sharpe ratio of
restaurant firms in all different models. For the hotel sector, solvency, sales growth and
size significantly affected hotel firm performance measured by the Proxy Q when only
differences among firms (i.e., unit effects) were considered. From time effects’
perspective, liquidity, activity ratio, profitability and business diversification played
important roles in influencing the Proxy Q. On the other hand, only sales growth had a
significant impact on hotel firm’s Sharpe ratio when merely firm heterogeneity was
considered. Dividend and business diversification had significantly differentiated hotel
firm’s total risk-adjusted performance in the time effects model. No significant results
were yielded for systematic risk-based firm performance measured by the Treynor ratio
in both the hotel and restaurant sectors. It should be pointed out that all the random
effects models under the perspective of time effects have the exact same results as the
OLS models. With only a 5-year period, the effects of time dynamics were confirmed to
be minimal. The empirical results verify the reason why most literature in panel data
regression has only taken into account of unit effects models.
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Hypotheses Testing
This section presents the results of the six hypotheses constructed in Chapter 3.
Hypothesis I posits that the examined firm-wise financial factors will have impacts on
firm performance in terms o f value-based return in the restaurant sector. This hypothesis
is statistically supported at the 0.05 significance level that at least one financial factor
significantly affects firm performance, which is measured by the Proxy Q.
Hypothesis II posits that the examined firm-wise financial factors will have impacts
on firm performance in terms o f total risk-adjusted return in the restaurant sector. This
hypothesis is statistically supported at the 0.05 significance level that at least one
financial factor significantly affects firm performance as the Sharpe ratio surrogates firm
performance.
Hypothesis III posits that the examined firm-wise financial factors will have impacts
on firm performance in terms o f systematic risk-adjusted return in the restaurant sector.
This hypothesis is not supported when firm performance is evaluated by the Treynor
ratio.
Hypothesis IV postulates that the examined firm-wise financial factors will have
impacts on firm performance in terms of value-based return in the hotel sector. This
hypothesis is statistically supported at the 0.05 significance level that at least one
financial factor significantly affects firm performance, which is measured by the Proxy
Q.

Hypothesis V postulates that the examined firm-wise financial factors will have
impacts on firm performance in terms of total risk-adjusted return in the hotel sector. This
hypothesis is statistically supported at the 0.05 significance level that at least one
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financial factor significantly affects firm performance as the Sharpe ratio surrogates firm
performance.
Hypothesis VI postulates the examined firm-wise financial factors will have impacts
on firm performance in terms of systematic risk-adjusted return in the hotel sector. This
hypothesis is not supported when firm performance is evaluated by the Treynor ratio.

Summary
Panel regression analysis and results were presented in this chapter. The underlying
assumptions were checked first. Summaries of descriptive statistics and correlation tables
were then reported. Following the test procedures, relevant data analysis were presented
and discussed for both the restaurant and hotel sectors by three performance measures.
Conclusions, summary and future research will be presented in Chapter 5.
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CHAPTER 5

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Introduction
The goal of financial management of any company is to establish the best possible
financial policy (i.e., financing, investing and dividend decisions) to improve firm
performance, the lifeblood of a company. There has been a proliferation of studies over
the years in the realm o f corporate finance to develop numerous theories in an effort to
understand the relationships between firm-wise financial factors and firm performance.
The reasons for this study to select firm-wise financial factors are several. First, financial
factors, unlike corporate culture, location, and competition, are direct, objective and
measurable. Second, firm-wise financial factors are those that can be controlled and
influenced by hospitality manager’s decisions. Non-firm specific financial factors, such
as the general economic conditions, the market trends, which are usually beyond the
firm’s control, are not considered in this study. Third, previous studies did find individual
financial factors’ impacts on firm performance, but not in a comprehensive way. This
study is intended to investigate these factors in an integrated mode. Fourth, through the
extensive review of the related literature, most firm-wise financial factors, such as
liquidity, solvency, and growth, hold so-called optimal structures both theoretically and
empirically (Moyer, McGuigan, & Kretlow, 2001). This optimal point is associated with
best firm performance; any where below or above this point will undermine firm
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performance. A positive relationship holds between the specific financial factor and firm
performance before the optimal point is reached. A negative relationship prevails after
the target point is passed. Thus, it is the responsibility of the hospitality management
team to craft the mix and percentages of many firm-specific financial factors to optimize
firm performance. The inconclusive patterns of results exhibited by prior research on
firm-wise financial factors and firm performance calls for an empirical investigation in
the hospitality industry.
The objective of the study is to investigate the relationship between firm-wise
financial factors and firm performance in the hospitality industry (i.e., the hotel and
restaurant sector). A handful of potential firm-wise financial factors have appeared in the
financial literature, which set up a foundation for the linear model tested in this study. Indepth interpretations and insightful implications of the findings will be also provided in
this study. With a methodologically sound design, findings of this study from the
analyses of these financial factors may shed light on how to improve firm performance
for the hospitality managers. Additionally, the knowledge generated from this study will
contribute to the body o f the hospitality financial management knowledge.
This chapter first presents the summary of the study. Implications of the findings of
study for the hospitality industry are discussed next in the hospitality industry. Lastly,
this chapter provides some recommendations for future research.

Summary of the Study
The purpose o f this study is to examine the impacts of firm-wise financial factors on
firm performance in the restaurant and hotel sectors. Linear regression models with panel
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data were proposed with a consideration of both research questions and a review of
related literature. Both the hotel and restaurant sectors were assessed by three different
types of firm performance measure (Tobin’s Q, Sharpe ratio, and Treynor ratio) as each
represented firm performance from different angles. Six hypotheses were constructed in
this study accordingly. Nine different firm-wise financial factors ( liquidity, solvency,
activity, growth, profitability, size, dividend policy, business diversification, and
geographical diversification) were the independent variables in the regression.
Relevant hospitality firm data were derived from COMPUSTAT and CRSP according
to their individual NACIS codes. The period of 2000-2004 was the time frame for this
study given the availability of relevant firm data since the start o f the new millennium.
The sample o f the restaurant sector and hotel sector have 256 and 151 firm/year
observations, respectively, involving 56 restaurant firms and 32 hotel firms. With the data
being both cross-sectional and time-series data in nature, panel regression technique was
used for estimating models. The Hausman specification test, the incremental F test and
the Breusch and Pagan LM test were used to identify the most appropriate model among
the constant coefficient model (i.e., the pooled OLS model), the fixed effects model, and
the random effects model. The results were obtained after several assumptions were
checked.
The restaurant sector was relatively less liquid but highly solvent, with a moderate
growth rate and profitability. Not many restaurant firms paid out dividends, nor did they
have business and geographical diversifications. On the other hand, the hotel sector was
relatively liquid but less solvent, with a lower growth rate and very poor profitability.
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Only about one third of the hotels (firm/year) paid out dividends. Many diversification
activities, either business or geographical, occurred for hotel firms through 2000 to 2004.
Solvency, activity ratio, liquidity, sales growth, profitability, size, dividend payout and
business diversification may influence restaurants’ firm performance in terms of the
Proxy Q whereas profitability was the only significant factor of restaurant firm
performance measured by the Sharpe ratio. For the hotel companies, solvency, sales
growth, size, liquidity, activity ratio, profitability and business diversification had
significant impacts on the Proxy Q. However, only sales growth appeared to be highly
related with the Sharpe ratio in hotels. No statistically significance was found between
firm-wise financial factors and the systematic risk-adjusted firm performance (i.e., the
Treynor ratio) for either the hotel or restaurant sector.

Implications of the Findings
Implications of the results are discussed next from two different perspectives (unit
effects and time effects) for both the restaurant and hotel sectors.
The Restaurant Sector
Proxy Q
From a unit effects’ perspective, solvency and activity ratio were found to be
significant determinants o f firm performance as measured by the Proxy Q during 20002004 (See Table 11). Activity ratio had a positive and significant effect on firm
performance, which was supportive of both the theoretical foundation (Moyer et al.,
2001) and the empirical evidence (Roenfeldt & Cooley, 1978). Solvency was shown to be
negatively related with restaurant firm performance. The negative sign of solvency
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indicated that costs of using debt in restaurant firms overweighed benefits of using debt,
which supported the findings reported by John (1993) and Capon, Farley, and Hoenig
(1990)’s studies. Debt structure of the restaurant sector was beyond the optimal level.
Therefore, restaurants with relatively higher value of asset utilization and lower value of
debt usage were more likely to achieve better firm performance compared to those with
relatively lower asset turnover and higher debt percentages. Higher activity ratio indicates
firm’s better efficiency and effectiveness, which exhibited positive relationship on
restaurant firm performance. Using less debt was favored to yield better firm
performance for restaurants.
In consideration of only time effects among firms, liquidity, sales growth,
profitability, dividend payout, size, and business diversification significantly contributed
to restaurant firm performance in addition to solvency and activity ratio during 2000 to
2004 (see Table 11). Liquidity, activity, sales growth, profitability, size, business
diversification variables had positive impacts on restaurant firm performance over these 5
years. The empirical evidence was in line with the findings of many previous studies
(Baskin, 1987; Capon et al, 1990; Hoskisson, Johnson, & Moesel, 1994; Jacobson, 1987;
Keating, 1997; Keats & Hitt, 1988; Myers, 1977; Roenfeldt & Cooley, 1978; Villalonga,
2004). During these 5 years, the shortage costs of liquidity assets on average exceeded
the holding costs of liquid assets in the restaurant sector. Restaurants were suggested to
retain relative more liquid assets in order to prevent from the potential bankruptcy.
Effectiveness and efficiency could help restaurants gain better performance. Larger
restaurants with more assets, rapid sales growth rates and more business diversifications
achieved good firm performance. Solvency and dividend payout, on the other hand.
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affected firm performance negatively. Relatively higher debt ratio and the act of paying
dividend resulted in lower restaurant performance in a significant way. The financial
costs and agency costs associated with more debt were greater than the tax benefits of the
debt. Meanwhile, paying out dividend signaled the firm did not have confidence in and
good expectations o f its own projects. Therefore, a restaurant which wanted to improve
its firm performance over time may consider increasing the values of financial factors
which had positive relationships with firm performance and/or decreasing the values of
the factors which were negatively related with firm performance.
Geographical diversification did not appear to have any significant influence on
restaurant firm performance measured by the Proxy Q in any models from 2000-2004.
The potential reason might be the scarcity of restaurant firms’ significant foreign
presence, which could lead to an insignificant effect on firm performance.
Sharpe Ratio
Profitability showed to be significantly associated with restaurant firm performance
as measured by the Sharpe ratio in all different models from 2000-2004. The higher
profitability was, the better performance was. The rest of firm-wise financial factors did
not have direct impacts on the Sharpe ratio in the restaurant sector. There were at least
two potential reasons. Market usually consists of a large group of heterogeneous
investors who may hold various opinions about the firm’s financial structures. Different
financial structures are associated with different levels of risks. For instance, low debt
ratio may be considered as a combination of both lower return and lower risk. When the
total risk was adjusted, only high profitability was shown to be rewarded by the market
for the restaurant sector in this study. Additionally, profitability might act as the
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middleman between these insignificant firm-specific financial factors and the total riskadjusted performance measure. These insignificant firm-specific financial factors might
significantly determine the value of profitability, which in turn, effectively affected the
Sharpe ratio. Thus, market or investors perceived restaurant firm performance based only
on firm’s profitability as evidenced by this study for whatever reasons. This finding
confirmed that profitability was a good indicator of firm performance (Hoskisson et al.,
1994). An increase in profits could evidently improve restaurant total risk-adjusted firm
performance.
Strategic Suggestions for the Restaurant Sector
Restaurants can implement certain financial strategies to improve their performance.
Restaurant firms could finance their capital through issuing more common stocks and less
debt to improve their performance as increased leverage (debt ratio) was significantly and
negatively related to firm performance. Less debt was still preferred though the restaurant
sector was in the relative low-debt category. Being a well-established and mature
industry, it is very difficult for restaurants to achieve relatively higher returns. Thus, the
key for restaurant management was to lower financial risk through a reduction of debt
percentages to improve firm performance. Further, it proved to be both safer and better to
keep debt at a fairly lower level in a much fluctuated economic conditions during 20002004 for the restaurant sector.
The positive relationship between liquidity and firm performance in this study
suggests that an increase in liquidity value can also help a restaurant firm improve its
performance by either decreasing its current obligations or increasing it current assets.
The average current ratio of the restaurant sector was .933, indicating it was a less liquid
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sector. During the economic fluctuation of these 5 years, holding relative more liquid
assets could reduce potential bankruptcy costs in an unstable economic environment.
While it is hard to adjust the left side of the balance sheet (i.e., the assets structure),
restaurant managers can certainly either transform current liabilities to long-term debts or
retire some portion of current liabilities by issuing more stocks to make the firms more
liquid.
Growing restaurants into bigger and larger organizations and diversifying restaurant
into more business segments with a reduction of dividend payout could be other means to
improve firm performance due to the significant relationship between size, business
diversification, sales growth, dividend policy and firm performance. Restaurants used to
be considered small companies. Growing into larger firms can help them increase their
visibility and publicity among the public as well as enhance their market dominance,
share and bargaining power. This was particular true for restaurant firms to withstand the
market fluctuations. Restaurants may sustain their growth by retaining more of their
profits into retained earnings for their future development, sacrificing current dividend
payout for their future rapid growths, and diversifying the business into related business
segments, such as franchise operations and retailing businesses.
The positive relationships between profitability ratio, activity ratio and restaurant
performance have confirmed the importance of the management effectiveness and
efficiency. Both sales and profits are very important to the health of the restaurant sector.
These two accounting measures can also be utilized to align management’s benefits with
shareholder’s.
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The Hotel Sector
Proxy Q

Under the perspective o f unit effects, solvency, sales growth and size were deemed to
significantly affect hotel firm performance as measured by the Proxy Q during 20002004. Solvency negatively affected firm performance, similar to what have been found in
the restaurant sector. The costs of adding more debt outpaced the benefits of debts. Sales
growth and size, on the other hand, showed significant and positive impacts on firm
performance. These results were consistent with the previous studies (Capon et al, 1990;
Child, 1972; John, 1993; Keating, 1997; Keats & Hitt, 1988). Compared to their peers in
other industries, hotel companies with relatively higher values of sales growth and total
assets and lower percentage of debt usage were more likely to achieve better firm
performance. Higher sales growth and larger firm size reflected firm’s great outlook of
future earnings and market dominance, which also improved hotel performance. Using
less debt was once again confirmed to gain better firm performance for hotel firms. The
remainder o f firm-specific financial factors yielded non-significant impacts on hotel firm
performance.
When only time differences were considered, liquidity, activity, profitability, and
dividend variables appeared to greatly and positively influence hotel firm performance
during 2000-2004. On the other hand, this study found more business diversifications
might result in poor hotel performance. These findings were consistent with some
previous studies (Baskin, 1987; Comment & Jarrell, 1994; Jacobson, 1987; Lang & Stulz,
1994; Mooradian & Yang, 2001; Myers, 1977; Roenfeldt & Cooley, 1978; Varaiya &
Kerin, 1987). Hotel firms could improve their performance over time by incrementing the
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values of liquidity, activity ratio, profitability, and dividend payout which had positive
relationships with firm performance. Holding more current assets may enhance firm’s
financial position to stay away from potential bankruptcy in the unstable economy
(Moyer et al., 2001). Improvement on internal management as measured by the
management effectiveness and efficiency (i.e., activity ratio and profitability), enhanced
firm performance as well. More dividend payouts satisfied the interests of various
stakeholders o f hotels. Furthermore, the unique features of the hotel sector, such as 24/7,
seasonality, perishability, cyclicality, service orientation, differ itself from most other
industry sectors. The knowledge gained from the hotel business is difficult to transfer to
other businesses. Higher business diversification implies lower relatedness among
different properties within a firm. Thus, hotels were suggested not to diversify into other
business segments as such may ruin firm performance.
Similar to the results found in the restaurant sector, whether hotel business had
foreign presence or not did not significantly affect firm performance. About 30% of hotel
observations (firm/year) had significant foreign sales, but these moves did not have
significant impacts on firm performance. The motive for hotels to have foreign presence
was questionable from the viewpoint o f financial performance.
Sharpe Ratio
Sales growth appeared to be the only significant factor on hotel firm performance as
measured by the Sharpe ratio from 2000-2004 when only firm effects were considered.
The better hotel firm performance was associated with a higher growth rate. In other
words, higher growth signaled a better firm performance perceived by the market in an
unstable economic condition. Rapid sales growth was a value added strategy which
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resulted in improved hotel firm performance. The result was in line with the findings by
Keats and Hitt (1988) and Child (1972). On the other hand, dividend and business
diversification affected hotel firm performance in a significant way under the assumption
of only time effects. Hotels with fewer business diversifications and more dividend
payout tended to have better firm performance over themselves. Thus, hotel firm’s sales
growth, dividend policy and business diversification were perceived to be important by
the market. The benefits (returns) associated with higher growth, more dividend payout
and fewer business diversifications were greater than the costs (risks) embedded with
these practice, thereby improving total risk-adjusted hotel firm performance. On the other
hand, this study found that liquidity, solvency, activity, profitability, geographical
presence did not demonstrate significant impacts on hotel total risk-adjusted firm
performance. The potential reason could be that these effects may have been accounted
for by either firm differences or time differences measured by the Sharpe ratio in the
hotel sector.
Strategic Suggestions for the Hotel Sector
Hotel firms can take certain actions to adjust their financial policies to improve their
performance. The empirically negative relationship between solvency and firm
performance suggests that hotel firms’ current debt leverage has exceeded the optimal
level and reducing debt use can improve firm performance. Though debt usage could
bring a number of benefits such as less cost o f capital and tax shields, the financial costs
and risks associated with higher debt ratio exceeded the benefits, leading to poorer firm
performance. Similar to the suggestions given to the restaurant businesses, hotels are also
recommended to go back to the optimal capital structure by a reduction of debt
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percentages. Although the interest rates were at the historical lower levels during these 5
years, the influx of more debt bearings for hotels did harm to their performance. Hotel
firms could improve their performance by retiring or converting debt to stocks. A prudent
financing mix leaning toward relatively low debt is advisable. Similar to the suggestions
given in the restaurant sector, hotels are advised to remain conservative; that is, using less
debt in an unstable economic environment.
Hotel should make the companies more liquid by changing the mix of current
accounts to enhance firm performance as more liquidity improved firm performance. The
liquidity shortage costs were tested to overwhelm the liquidity holding costs. Thus, hotel
firms are suggested to approach the optimal liquidity structure by adding more liquid
assets. The possible reason was again that more flexibility in liquid assets can greatly
mitigate the financial stress costs in an uncertain circumstance.
Sales growth was found to be a significantly positive factor to hotels as well. Not only
can sales growth increases its market share, and synergy, but also increase a firm’s
publicity and hold out the economic swings. The series of merges and acquisitions which
increase both assets and revenues in the hotel sector in recent years appeared to be
successful. Meanwhile, the significant and negative sign of business diversion suggested
hotels’ keeping focused on the core accommodation business rather than expand to other
business sectors in order to reduce potential market risks. Diversification into other
business segments had adverse consequences for hotels, due to increasing costs in
diversified resources. Furthermore, distribution of dividend in the hotel sector was
perceived to be good. Since the hotel is a highly cyclical business, the return on
investment o f hotels would be less than the market average during the economic
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downturn. Thus, it was wise to distribute the dividend to its shareholders during 20002004 for hotel companies.
Profitability and activity ratio gauge the effectiveness and efficiency o f the decision
making process and assets utilization of a hotel firm. They are two internal financial
benchmarks to guide hotel’s operation and measure how good the management team is.
Increasing profits and enhancing effectiveness and efficiency are involved with more
than just financial strategies. Great marketing ideas, new products development,
consistent quality service, right price approaches, and implementation of good projects
can enhance hotels profitability and activity ratio, thereby improving firm performance.
Improving and maintaining profitability and activity ratios high can draw hotel firms
towards value maximization, which is the best interest of the shareholders. Management
at all levels should drive its capability to pursue for these objectives.

Recommendations for Future Research
The relationship between firm-wise financial factors and firm performance was
empirically evaluated in the hospitality industry from 2000 through 2004. This study
provides a foundation on which future studies can be developed.
First, the success o f the hospitality industry rests on its ability to service the needs of
both customers, as measured by the satisfaction and loyalty, and shareholders, by firm
financial performance. The models advanced in this study may help hospitality managers
satisfy the needs o f shareholders to improve firm performance vis-à-vis firm-specific
financial factors. Aside from financial performance measures, some subjective or
judgmental performance ones, which are customer-based and employee-based, such as
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customer and employee satisfaction or loyalty, may be used in the future along with the
objective financial performance measures.
Second, some theoretical constructs, such as managerial ownership and institutional
ownership, which were reviewed in Chapter 2, were not empirically examined in the
study, owing to the lack of data sources. Inclusion of both managerial ownership and
institutional ownership variables in the model may provide more comprehensive outlooks
for the hospitality industry.
Third, this study examined the impacts of unit effects and time effects in panel data
separately because of the software’s constraints. A more realistic picture could have been
painted if both unit and time effects were simultaneously tested in one equation with
much more smooth interpretations.
Fourth, it may be noted that no significant results were found when the Treynor ratio
was used as the measure o f systematic risk-adjusted firm performance in both the
restaurant and hotel sector. This may deserve further investigations for a future study.
Finally, as with much research of this similar nature, the findings in different time
periods might be different (Keats & Hitt, 1988). Thus, future studies may examine the
model in the context o f another time frame to confirm the findings and conclusions of
this study. Comparisons of similar models in different time spans might reveal important
implications for hospitality managers.
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